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Abstract
The U.S. initiated U.S.-Saudi relations out of fear of resource scarcity and dependence on
overseas oil; however, the U.S. has never been dependent on Arabian oil. Rather, the U.S.
projected its influence to secure the Middle East’s balance of power, the global oil market, and
American hegemony. U.S.-Saudi relations have withstood seismic world events, diplomatic
crises, and domestic turmoil because the partnership’s value extends far beyond the exchange of
oil for security. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia wield their relations to pursue their respective
national and global interests, which has historically provided sufficient justification for the U.S.
to overlook the nations’ conflicting moralities and strategic visions. However, U.S. success in
hydraulic fracking for shale oil increases U.S. energy independence and takes Washington off its
“diplomatic tightrope” with Riyadh. While U.S. foreign policy is liberated from Saudi influence,
the U.S. shale revolution conceives a poor outlook for the kingdom’s stability. Shale oil’s
implications on the global oil market jeopardize Saudi Arabia’s oil-dependent economy and
system of governance, as well the kingdom’s ability to wield its oil revenue to resolve domestic
and regional threats. Saudi instability is further exacerbated under Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman’s (MBS) growingly assertive foreign policy and disregard for regional peace and
international law. The kingdom's divergence from U.S. interests, in conjunction with the U.S.
shale revolution, incite a widespread American demand for a re-evaluation of U.S.-Saudi
relations. U.S. foreign policy has unprecedented flexibility to reevaluate the kingdom’s value
proposition and the terms of an enduring partnership. This paper will evaluate the dominant
arguments from Saudi Arabia and American Democrat and Republican policymakers on the
direction of relations. My thesis discussion will conclude that a progressive course correction is
an optimal strategy for U.S. foreign policy to sustain and reform a U.S.-Saudi partnership that
still holds value.
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Introduction & Methodology
The U.S.- Saudi Arabia “special relationship” is at a critical juncture, and my thesis seeks
to address the foundation, challenges, and transformation that has led to the revaluation of their
future relations. My thesis will first establish the premise on which the U.S.-Saudi relationship
began, as this will be essential in understanding how it transforms over the decades. Chapter I of
my paper will focus on the post-war era up to the Iraq/Second Gulf War in 2003. The
prominence of oil-as-power ideology, resource scarcity fears, and resource imperialism in the
aftermath of colonial rule, World War II, and the Cold War, cast the U.S. into a plight to fulfill
their increasing demand for its limited natural resource. This section will delve into the U.S.’s
energy dependence on overseas oil and Saudi Arabia’s role as a swing producer. Utilizing the
balance of power theory, Saudi Arabia's role will be deemed as an instrument of state power to
keep the global oil market balanced, as well as to maintain internal and regional stability. Oil’s
strategic importance, for U.S. energy dependence and Saudi Arabia’s security, will be assessed
against its influence on political and military behavior, such as the 1970s energy crisis, U.S.’s
military expansion in the Persian Gulf, and the U.S. response to 9/11. The events I will discuss in
this segment will set the precedent of the overwhelming influence of oil security in international
relations.
Chapter II of my thesis will start with the 2006 U.S. shale revolution and the U.S.’s
increased energy independence. The U.S. shale revolution will be analyzed in-depth to provide
an understanding of the economic and political threats to Saudi Arabia and Middle Eastern
stability. The rentier state theory will be applied to the kingdom’s internal threats, underpinning
the role of oil in Saudi’s domestic stability. Rentierism seeks to explain “state-society relations in
states that generate a large proportion of their income from rents, or externally-derived,
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unproductively-earned payments,” such as Saudi Arabia with their oil revenue. 1 Furthermore,
Chapter II assesses shale oil’s threat to Saudi Arabia’s role in the Middle East’s balance of power
and global oil market. My thesis will utilize statistical evidence to provide quantitative support
for the development of U.S. and Saudi Arabia’s oil industries and global oil market. Statistical
data will include, but is not limited to oil market price, percentage of oil exports and imports, and
percentage of oil revenue of total revenue. The data will help rationalize the role of oil in
American and Saudi foreign policy and strategy. In accumulation, this chapter will highlight how
the surge in shale oil production liberated U.S. foreign policy from resource scarcity fears and
significantly shifted Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance to the U.S.
Chapter III of my thesis will focus on the future of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The
challenges that the relationship has endured over the decades, and which I evaluate in the first
two chapters, stress the gravity of a change in a U.S-Saudi alliance. Before diving into arguments
over the future direction of the partnership, a historical background on the origins of the debate
will contextualize U.S. and Saudi perspectives. First, Saudi Arabia’s stance on future U.S.
relations will be evaluated, which addresses that discontent and the urge for a foreign policy
change is arising solely from the U.S. perspective. The two dominant U.S. arguments for the
direction of U.S. engagement in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East are to either disengage (to
varying degrees) or maintain engagement in conjunction with a progressive relationship reform. I
will draw upon interviews with the Saudi Crown Prince, American policymakers, government
officials, and Middle East and oil experts to articulate U.S. and Saudi perspectives.
Additionally, I utilize the international relations theories of balance of power and the
realism paradigm to analyze the circumstances and interests surrounding the U.S.-Saudi relations

1 Gray, “A Theory of 'Late Rentierism' in the Arab

States of the Gulf,” 1.
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debate. The balance of power theory explains nations’ diplomatic and political action in their oil
strategies. The realism paradigm suggests that oil is a ‘power element’ that states, as rational
actors, use in foreign policy to expand state power and influence.2 I will use these theories, as
well as U.S. and Saudi perspectives, to expound on the multitude of interests surrounding oil,
including economic, political, social, and security agendas. Furthermore, I will evaluate the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia’s respective value proposition for an enduring partnership. The concept of
value proposition weighs the drawbacks against the benefits in international relations to
determine whether a partnership promotes or harms national interests. A strong value proposition
for each nation means that the partnership is worthwhile, but U.S. arguments concur that Saudi
Arabia is currently presenting a weak value proposition. Despite this evaluation, Chapter III
argues that the relationship has enduring value that can be reprised with a progressive reform.
My thesis concludes with a succinct review of Washington's agenda for a U.S-Saudi
progressive policy correction. The process for policymakers to implement international relations
changes is a complex process, and the construction of a U.S.-Saudi reform policy is still in its
infancy stages. As a result, I offer one possible example of how U.S. interest can be translated
into policy and political action. The Conclusion will analyze the means and viability of
implementing future reform, including Saudi Arabia’s willingness to cooperate. Amid the U.S.’s
unprecedented energy independence and foreign policy flexibility, I hope this paper will
contribute to the international security and relations fields in considering the new direction for
U.S-Saudi relations. Shale’s liberation of the U.S. from the myth of Saudi oil dependency will
unearth America’s extensive strategic interest in sustaining relations with Saudi Arabia, as well
as the progressive reform needed to foster an enduring and productive partnership.

2 Česnakas, "Energy Resources in Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Approach," 37.
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Literature Review
At the start of my research, David Yergin’s The Prize introduced the concept of oil-aspower that inspired my thesis. Yergin recounts a panoramic history of oil, starting with its
discovery in the U.S. and ending after the 1970s energy crisis. He marks oil as the commodity of
which non-state actors and nations pursue in the attainment of wealth and power. 3 Oil forcefully
affects the state of the world economy, and fluctuation in supply and demand can lead to
depression or prosperity. Furthermore, oil security as a major national interest greatly influences
international relations and politics, especially through fueling global rivalries. Yergin argues that
the economic, political, and diplomatic power of nations is rooted in oil, and the commodity can
transform their destiny. The book provided a great starting off point for my paper, but I had to
look beyond The Prize for modern development and a greater Saudi Arabian focus.
David M. Wight’s Oil Money Oil Money: Middle East Petrodollars and the
Transformation of US Empire, 1967–1988 (The United States in the World) helps fill in where
Yergin left off. Wight uses a framework of integrated diplomatic, transnational, economic, and
cultural analysis, as well as extensive declassified U.S. and Middle Eastern records, to offer an
expansive investigation of Middle East-U.S. relations during the 1970s and 1980s and the
transformation of the US global empire by Middle East petrodollars. He argues that the Middle
Eastern role within the global system of U.S. power was reconstituted during these two decades,
from a supplier of cheap crude oil to a source of abundant petrodollars (the revenues earned from
the export of oil).4 In the 1970s, the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies, including the House of
Saud in Saudi Arabia, utilized petrodollars to fund a variety of joint initiatives for mutual

3
4

Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power.
Wight, Oil Money. Middle East Petrodollars and the Transformation of US Empire, 1967-1988.
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economic and geopolitical benefit. Petrodollars augmented the power of the U.S. and its Middle
East allies, but they also had wide-ranging and contradictory effects on the Middle East–US
relations and the geopolitics of globalization. Wight argues that in addition to beneficial effects,
petrodollars also fostered economic disruptions, state-sponsored violence, and respective antiinterdependence sentiment.
Victor McFarland’s Oil Powers evaluates the U.S.-Saudi Arabia alliance during the same
pivotal decades as Wight. McFarland connects foreign relations and domestic politics to evaluate
the political, economic, and social connections that led to the growth of the U.S.-Saudi alliance.
Through this framework, he challenges the pervasive view that the U.S.-Saudi alliance is the
inevitable consequence of American energy demand and Saudi Arabia’s abundant oil reserves.
He attributes the political, economic, and social connections and U.S.-Saudi mutually beneficial
collaboration as bolstering royal and executive power and the national-security state.5 Leaders of
both countries responded to the higher oil prices and the shifts in the Middle East’s balance of
power during the 1970s by consolidating their alliance. Their collaboration included the U.S.
empowering Saudi Arabia’s influence in the Middle East, and Saudi Arabia promoting a
rightward shift in U.S. foreign and economic policy. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia's behavior can
be identified as advancing their shared and respective interests. McFarland argues that the
implications of the alliances set the groundwork for U.S. military involvement in the Middle East
and the entrenchment of a global order fueled by oil.
Yergin, Wight, and McFarland provide a fundamental introduction to one of the driving
forces behind modern international relations and the U.S.-Saudi alliance. These books were
essential in establishing a foundation of knowledge on which I could start writing my thesis.

5

McFarland, Oil Powers: A History of the U.S.-Saudi Alliance.
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Thereafter, I sought to narrow my research and develop my argument, of which Robert Vitalis’
Oilcraft played a pivotal role. Vitalis exposes myths of oil that have long been accepted as
conventional wisdom. These myths include that U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf is
what guarantees access to oil and that the special relationship with Saudi Arabia is necessary to
stabilize an otherwise volatile market. 6 These misconceptions are pervasive among the U.S.
public and scholars alike, and before reading Oilcraft’s corrective narrative, I was caught by the
same erroneous line of thinking. Vitalis exposes the make-believe fears of oil scarcity and
conflict that have driven economic, political, and military policy for decades. Furthermore, he
investigates the geopolitical impact of these myths, such as how they confuse many into
believing the U.S. is dependent on Saudi Arabia for oil. Al Saud does many things for U.S.
investors, firms, and government agencies, but guaranteeing the flow of oil and keeping prices
stable and cheap are not included. The benefit of debunking the myths of “oilcraft” is essential in
the development of U.S. policy and decision-making in the Middle East. In the wake of the Shale
Revolution and the U.S.’s increased energy independence, Vitalis calls for a reevaluation of the
US’s ‘devil’s bargain’ with Saudi Arabia based on the real nature of oil’s influence on economic,
military, and diplomatic policy, and it is to this call that I hope my thesis can contribute.
The last source that wields a pervasive influence in my thesis is Daniel Benaim’s 2020
report for The Century Foundation (TCF), A Progressive Course Correction for U.S.–Saudi
Relations. Benaim is an expert on U.S. policy in the Middle East, serving as Vice President
Biden’s Middle East policy advisor from 2013 to 2015 and currently working as the U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Arabian Peninsula Affairs. Benaim’s report for TCF is a part of a
series that offers progressive policy proposals for America’s most pressing international

6

Vitalis, Oilcraft: The Myths of Scarcity and Security That Haunt U.S. Energy Policy.
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priorities. Benaim conducted over fifty interviews with policymakers, experts, and activists on
how to achieve a progressive course correction of U.S. ties with Saudi Arabia. The identities of
the interviewees were kept anonymous for this report so that they could speak openly and
truthfully. Benaim discovers that former and current American government employees, including
diplomats, political appointees, congressional staff, as well as think tank officials, academics,
and activists are nearly unanimous in critiquing the U.S.’s current approach to Saudi Arabia. 7
However, beneath that consensus lay divergent understandings and perspectives on what
direction U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations should head. Benaim’s report discusses the two dominant
sides of how critique should be translated in U.S. foreign policy. On one side, some American
policymakers arguing for the enduring value of U.S.–Saudi relations, warn of the significant
downsides of U.S. abandonment, and urge for a relationship reform. On the other side,
Americans drawing on the fundamental incompatibility of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, call the
partnership “unreliable, unpalatable, outdated, and overrated.” Pro-disengagement advocates
argue for the U.S. disengagement with Saudi Arabia. Benaim discusses the two sides and
adjudicates these differences to offer progressive policy proposals for America’s future with
Saudi Arabia. This TCF report offers my paper critical primary source material for U.S.
arguments over the direction of U.S.-Saudi relations. The interviews cover Democrat,
Republican, and non-partisan perspectives, which provides a comprehensive American
articulation of the major changes desired. Furthermore, the report presents policy
recommendations to address how the U.S. can execute reforms of U.S.-Saudi relations. While
specifying which American foreign policy decision is best is beyond the scope of this thesis, I
will draw on Benaim’s policy recommendations to present options to the U.S. in my conclusion.

7

Benaim, “A Progressive Course Correction for U.S.–Saudi Relations.”
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My thesis seeks to address the Shale Revolutions' impact on the US-SA relationship, their
respective security, and their future relations. After decades of close relations, the U.S.’s
increased oil supply invigorates the argument for decreasing involvement in Saudi Arabia and
the Persian Gulf. While Oilcraft dispels the idea that the U.S. is only allied with Saudi Arabia for
its oil, the argument for decreased involvement persists. In order to provide a comprehensive
analysis and prediction of the future of the US-SA relation, I will include a wide range of
perspectives on the topic. This includes narratives from Al Saud, Saudi Arabian citizens, the
Middle East, the United States government, American citizens, shale producers, and
conventional oil producers. Lastly, I will add my own opinion on which course of action will
promote the greatest energy security and national stability for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

Chapter I: The Birth and Evolution of U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations
Introduction
Oil is a revolutionary commodity in the 21st century world and a major determinant in
U.S. and Middle Eastern international relations and strategy. Access to affordable oil, through
imports or domestic production, dictates nations’ welfare power, and consequently, energy
security is at the forefront of nations’ foreign policy agendas. However, the natural resource is
finite and geographically predisposed to certain regions. Geographical determinism predisposes
the Middle East with vast oil reserves, and Saudi Arabia with the largest known oil reserves in
the region. Saudi Arabia holds the world’s dominant oil supplies and production capabilities,
which grants the kingdom the role of swing producer in the global oil market. As a result, Saudi
Arabia has considerable clout in international relations and over the world’s energy security. The
world’s addiction to oil directs foreign policy and relations, including the “special relationship”
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.
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The outline for Chapter I begins with a historical background on the importance of oil.
Since the U.S. first introduced oil in the mid-1800s, the commodity has evolved from lighting
lamps to driving today’s globalized world. The increased value of oil leads into a brief account
of the birth of the U.S.-Saudi relations in 1945, which was founded on the exchange of U.S.
security for consistent access to Saudi oil. Next, this paper introduces the 1970s energy crisis, the
October War, and Saudi Arabia’s employment of the “oil weapon.” These interconnected events
strain U.S.-Saudi relations and significantly influence U.S. foreign policy concerning energy
security. The manifestation of these evolutions is explored through U.S.-Saudi increased
interdependence and the U.S.’s lasting expansion into the Persian Gulf. This strategic shift
emphasizes U.S. oil-dependency fears and Washington’s growingly assertive oil strategy.
Furthermore, U.S.-Saudi interdependence and military presence in the Gulf reinforces Arab antiAmerican sentiment, especially among terrorist groups. Al Qaeda is fueled by the U.S.’s long
history of aggressive foreign policy in the Middle East, which late 20th century oil strategy
perpetuates, and the implications are discussed in the context of Osama bin Laden’s 9/11 attacks
on the U.S. Lastly, the Conclusion establishes the significance of the U.S.-Saudi partnership’s
evolution from 1945 to 2001. Despite the partnership’s turmoil and plague of distrust, the
strategic value, for both sides, has exponentially grown. The initial premise of security for oil has
expanded to include economic, political, and military interests for the U.S. and Saudi alike.

Historical Background: Importance of Oil
Energy security is at the forefront of domestic and global politics regardless of a nations’
status as an energy-importer, like the United States, or energy-exporter, like Saudi Arabia. For
oil-importers, energy security ties national security to the availability of natural resources for
energy consumption. Oil-importing nations have limited or no domestic oil reserves, and
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consequently, their energy security depends on continuous access to an affordable supply.
Meanwhile, Oil-exporting nations have relatively inherent energy security as a result of abundant
reserves, and therefore, their national security depends on access to international oil markets and
consistent demand. For oil exporters and importers alike, energy security ensures national
security and economic development. In 2021, the modern world is now, more than ever,
dependent on oil for energy, and there is no readily available substitute. Out of the various
natural energy sources such as fossil fuels, renewable, and nuclear; oil is the number one
resource responsible for the world’s energy security. Oil is vital for the development of states
and the progress of civilization. Human welfare and standards of living depend on oil for basic
state functions, such as food production and medicine. Furthermore, oil fuels globalization and
the world economy with its role in transportation. Road vehicles, planes, and boats allow for easy
national and international trade, as well as the movement of people. Oil fuels modern
industrialization. In 2021, the global oil industry is worth $2.1 trillion, and the industry has yet to
peak. 8 Developed countries account for the majority of oil consumption, but a “rising 83% of the
world is undeveloped” and have yet to join the major consumers.9
Oil went from one of many valuable resources to the commodity the world’s rival powers
fight over.10 The surge in demand presents vast and complex challenges to every nation’s energy
security, and consequently, nations’ national and economic security as well. The threats to
energy security include, but are not limited to, supply depletion, the manipulation of oil
production, competition among consumers, and dependence on foreign oil. The political
instability of energy-producing countries further complicates energy security concerns. The

8 “What Percentage of the Global Economy Is the Oil and
9 Clemente, “Three Reasons Oil Will Continue to Run
10 Vitalis, Oilcraft, 126.

Gas Drilling Sector,” Investopedia.
the World.”
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global energy market is interdependent, and energy security requires cooperation and
coordination among countries to maintain a constant supply of energy. Yet, the relationship
between oil-producing and consuming countries, coupled with individual nations’ geopolitical
interests, generates significant conflict.
International relations are fueled by oil strategy. Nations’ stability and global prowess
depend on oil, yet geographical determinism means that oil reserves are concentrated in a small
number of countries. Therefore, nations must satisfy their energy security through domestic
production, if the nation has sufficient resources, or compete for oil access abroad. The Middle
East holds the majority of the world’s oil and Saudi Arabia, as a swing producer, holds one-fifth
of the world’s proven oil reserves.11 Saudi Arabia has more power than any other nation to shape
oil prices and play a leading role in the stability of the global oil market. The kingdom’s
production capacity and oil “cushion” can balance supply and demand by increasing or
decreasing supply to the market.12 The Saudi regime can rationally manipulate its swing
production for economic or political ends; although, the kingdom is predominantly interested in
sustaining a balanced oil market for consistent oil revenue, Price stability is vital for the
kingdom’s oil-dominated economy, with oil revenue accounting for 90% of its export earnings
and 80% of its state revenues, making the kingdom's political and economic stability particularly
vulnerable to market volatility. 13

11 AlYousef, “The Prominent Role of Saudi Arabia in

the Oil Market From 1997 to 2011,” 63.

12 McFarland, Oil Power, 183.
13 Saudi Arabia: Tackling Emerging Economic Challenges to Sustain Growth, IMF, 1.
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Figure 1: Percent of Total Crude Petroleum Exports by Country in 2019. (Total Exports:
$986 Billion).14

The Birth of U.S.-Saudi Relations: 1945
The U.S. believed that world oil scarcity was an imminent threat, but in the late 1930s,
U.S. oil company partners, Chevron and Texaco, discovered vast oil reserves under the Saudi
desert in the eastern part of the kingdom. 15 The discovery indicated that the world’s oil
production and supply would soon be shifting to the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia in
particular.16 Following the end of World War Two, the United States abandoned its policy of
isolationism in the Middle East. 17 Dependence on foreign oil and the end of imperialism
prompted the U.S. to pursue a mutually beneficial relationship with the oil-producing Middle
East. The ensuing Cold War with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) threatened
Middle Eastern oil resources, compelling the U.S. to pursue regional hegemony to ensure its
national energy security. President Roosevelt sought to develop a “special relationship” with

14

The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Which countries export Crude Petroleum? (2019.)”
Editors, “U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations.”.
16 CFR.org Editors, “U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations.”.
17 Ragaban, “The Geopolitical Implications,” 64.
15 CFR.org
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Saudi Arabia to secure U.S energy interests. President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud met aboard
the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal on Feb. 14, 1945.18 This was the first time a U.S. president
had met with a Saudi Arabian King. Roosevelt was insistent that Saudi Arabian oil would be
crucial to America’s security and welfare in the post-world war era. By virtue of the Chevron
and Texaco discovery and U.S. foreign oil dependency fears, the New York Times foreign affairs
correspondent, C. L. Sulzberger evaluated that “the immense oil deposits in Saudi Arabia alone
make that country more important to American diplomacy than almost any other smaller
nation.”19 Roosevelt’s agenda with the Saudi King was highly strategic. The whole affair was
off-the-record, with the official known purpose being to discuss the future of Palestine and a new
Jewish homeland. 20 Although this issue was ultimately left unsettled, the two leaders had a great
deal more success with discussing a deal for security in exchange for oil. Roosevelt and Ibn Saud
agreed upon a relationship whereby America would guarantee security aid to Saudi Arabia, then
just a budding country with a weak military and surrounded by stronger nations. The U.S.
promised security in exchange for access to consistent and affordable energy supplies, and
although there was never an official document outlining this agreement, every subsequent U.S.
president and monarch has upheld this understanding.

The U.S. Energy Crisis: 1970s
While this arrangement operated satisfactorily, U.S.-Saudi diplomatic relations reached
an all-time low with the kingdom employing the first ever “oil weapon” against the U.S. in the
early 1970s. Saudi’s oil weapon instilled a deep psychological trauma on the U.S. that would

18 Yergin, The Prize, 403.
19 Yergin, The Prize, 404-405
20 Yergin, The Prize, 404.
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come to influence American foreign policy and oil strategy for the ensuing decades. The onset of
the energy crisis began with the Allied power’s acquisition of Palestine in 1917. Following
World War II, the Allies adorned Palestine as the new state of Israel and chartered it to serve as a
new homeland for Jews displaced after World War II. The majority of the Arab nations rejected
the Israeli state, resulting in frequent violent conflicts and war. The fourth of the Arab-Israeli
wars, known as the Yom Kippur War or the October War, began in early October, 1973 and had
far-reaching consequences.
During the early 1970s and at the onset of the October War, Washington’s focus had
turned to its’ domestic oil security concerns. American oil consumption was surging just as
domestic oil production was declining. The number of U.S. drilling rigs had been steadily
declining since 1955 and fell to its lowest levels in 1970-1.21 The oil industry was straining to
keep up with demand, pumping every single barrel that it could. Despite these facts, the Nixon
administration demonstrated minimal concern, assuming that the U.S. could depend on Saudi
Arabia's oil exports. President Nixon attempted initiating price controls, abolishing the import
quota system, and introducing a “voluntary” allocation system to assure supplies to independent
refiners and marketers. 22 Nevertheless, domestic production could not keep up with demand, and
the phrase “energy crisis” became a common American political term to characterize oil
shortages.23
Similar to the U.S.-Saudi partnership, the U.S. sustained a long unofficial alliance with
Israel, and during the October War, the U.S. aided Israel against a coalition of Arab states, which
were led by Egypt and Syrian forces. Both sides of the war were supported by superpowers with

21 Yergin, The Prize, 589.
22 Yergin, The Prize, 590.
23 Yergin, The Prize, 590.
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the U.S. aiding Israel and the Soviet Union backing the Arab coalition, but only the former had
Saudi Arabia and the oil weapon. The oil weapon describes the control and manipulation of oil
through embargos, production cutbacks, and restrictions on exports. The integration of the oil
weapon into politics and war in the 1970s signaled a turning point in history. Oil had become the
lifeblood of industrial economies, and the global dependence on OPEC oil exports highlighted
the Arab member nation’s growing power and influence over the world’s economy and energy
security.
Israel needed U.S. military aid if Israel was to have a chance to win the war, especially
considering the grand extent to which the Soviet Union was supplying the Arab states. However,
the King of Saudi Arabia, Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, warned the U.S. of the consequences of
their continued support for Israel. In interviews with the Washington Post, the Christian Science
Monitor, Newsweek, and NBC Television, he delivered the same message: “We have no wish to
restrict our oil exports to the United States in any way,” but “America’s complete support for
Zionism and against the Arabs makes it extremely difficult for us to continue to supply the
United States with oil, or even to remain friends of the United States.” 24 The Saudis made their
views clear. The kingdom would use the oil weapon to influence the U.S. to disavow Israel and
stop all aid. Nevertheless, Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State, determined that the
possibility of damaging U.S.-Saudi relations were worth the risk to aid Israel—in part because
Kissinger and the Nixon administration underestimated the seriousness of the Saudi intention to
withhold oil. Even so, the U.S. attempted to aid Israel in secret, and President Nixon and other
Washington officials publicized, to a marginal degree, some disavowal of Israel policies.

24 Yergin, The Prize, 596-7.
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The idea of the oil weapon, in the form of an oil embargo used for a political agenda, had
been discussed in the Arab world since the 1950s, particularly concerning Israel. Yet the idea
was always dismissed because; while Arab oil was abundant, it was not the “supply of last
resort.” 25 Historically, the U.S. was sufficiently producing and could step in to supplement the
world oil market if Saudi Arabia withheld exports. However, in the early 1970s, U.S. production
rates were at max capacity and could no longer compensate for an OPEC oil embargo. 26 King
Faisal was initially reluctant to mix politics and oil, arguing it was useless and “dangerous to
even to think of that.” 27 He valued Saudi ties to the U.S. as important to his kingdom’s survival.
Faisal feared the Middle East’s spread of radicalism, as well as domestic challenges to his
political legitimacy, and U.S. military aid was a vital means of defense. Even so, Faisal could not
risk showing inadequate support for the “frontline” Arab states and the Palestinians without
risking violent backlash. 28 Furthermore, by 1973, Saudi Arabian oil had become the “supply of
last resort.”29 The reason to refrain from employing the oil weapon—the U.S.’s ability to make
up for a temporary supply shortfall—was no longer an impediment.
The U.S.’s depleting oil supply could no longer sustain its allies in the events of a crisis,
leaving the U.S. vulnerable to OPEC’s possession of the oil weapon. Saudi Arabia’s share of the
world’s exports had risen from 13% in 1970 to 21% and rising in 1973. 30 Additionally, market
prices had doubled.31 The rise in oil revenues, and Saudi’s large dollar reserves, was however
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threatened by the devaluation of the American dollar.32 The oil minister of Kuwait had already
imposed production restraints because he did not see “the point of producing more oil and selling
it for an unguaranteed paper currency.” 33 This rationale for oil-exporters withholding oil
supplies from the global oil market equally applies to Saudi Arabia, as the kingdom would
receive depleted compensation for its oil sales. The changes in the global oil market and value of
the U.S. dollar, coinciding with political developments, led King Faisal to pledge the
employment of the oil weapon during the October War. Saudi Arabia and OPEC imposed an oil
embargo on the U.S. and other nations who supported Israel, which remained in place even after
the war ended. Consequently, U.S.-Saudi relations reached an all-time low.
The Saudi government pledged to end the Arab oil embargo against the U.S. in January 1974,
but Faisal broke this assurance, at the insistence of the Arab OPEC members, claiming the
embargo will stay in place in effect until Syria regained territory from Israel. 34 Kissinger
furiously advised US ambassador James Akins to tell the Saudi regime that the U.S. would not
assist in the Syrian-Israeli conflict until the embargo was lifted. Furthermore, Akins would
threaten the exploitation of Saudi’s promise for an “imminent end” to the oil embargo.35 The
U.S. was threatening to publicly embarrass the Saudi regime. The kingdom’s oil minister Omar
Al-Saqqaf was enraged over this threat to Saudi’s reputation, as OPEC would view Saudi’s
promise to the U.S. as a betrayal to its member’s interests. In response to Akins, Saqqaf sharply
questioned “if the United States had any idea of what it was about to lose...?”36 The U.S. was
jeopardizing its political and economic interests, as well the advantage of military access in the
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region. Saqqaf declared, the “US-Saudi military association will have to be reviewed,” but “this
will cause no problems,” as “many European countries are anxious to replace the Americans.” 37
Saqqaf’s warning was well-founded, as many European and East Asian countries were ready to
fill in for the U.S in exchange for Saudi oil. 38 Overall, Saqqaf intended to apprise the U.S. of its
privileged position in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis granted the U.S. a favorable position because of
its strong economy and innovative technology, but Saudis were not reliant on the U.S. for the
kingdom’s survival and success. The 1970s energy crisis and growing petrodollar surpluses gave
Saudi Arabia newfound power and confidence, and the Nixon administration, realizing this
development, sought to mend the relationship. The House of Sauds, despite Saqqaf’s declaration
of not needing the U.S., was also inclined to repair relations. The embargos ended in March
1974, and while mistrust between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia remained, their mutually beneficial
alliance prevailed. 39
The use of oil as a geopolitical weapon had a dramatic impact on the U.S., although oil
experts Victor McFarland and Robert Vitalis assert that the embargo itself was essentially
ineffective. Kenneth Boulding, who advised the 1974 Ford Foundation study on America’s
energy future, agrees, describing the energy crisis as “a really minor incident as far as the
American economy was concerned; It did little more than ruffle it for a few months.” 40
Regardless of whether Saudi Arabia politically weaponized oil to stop U.S. support for Israel in
the October War, the U.S. and global oil markets would have still experienced an energy crisis.
OPEC’s decision to raise the posted price and tax rate for crude oil were independent of the war
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and embargos. The cost of oil production was increasing, and the U.S. dollar was losing its
value, and consequently, OPEC nations had to increase prices to ensure their fair share of the
windfall.41 Additionally, the demand from the world’s advanced industrial economies was
beginning to surpass supply, and the time lag for production to catch up to the demand resulted
in increased competitiveness on the market and global shortages. 42 These factors would
contribute to the increase in the market price of oil, regardless of the embargo—although the
implications did worsen scarcity fears and panic buying. The U.S. at the time was only receiving
about 7% of its imports from the Middle East, which supports Vitalis’ argument that U.S.
dependence on Saudi oil is a myth. The embargos and American oil shortages were exacerbated
by the price and allocation controls imposed by Nixon in 1971, thus Nixon and the U.S.’s poor
domestic energy policies were more responsible for America’s energy crisis than King Faisal. 43
While the oil weapon was materially ineffective, the energy crisis had lasting
psychological consequences on modern politics and strategy. 44 Robert Vitalis claims that “the
embargo is best understood as political theater” in which the “targeted audience,” the West, was
deeply moved. 45 U.S. confidence in its present and future energy security was undermined. The
“trauma of withdrawal” was manifested in the fear that any number of antagonists,
“from OPEC or the ‘Arabs’ or Iranian ‘hardliners’ to Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, and
any and all future would-be hegemons” could deploy the oil weapon again. 46 However, major
supply disruptions are a psychological fear. The Arab producers removed their embargos without
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achieving any of their demands because withholding oil is not in their best economic interest. 47
The economic interdependence between countries means that countries must consider the interest
of their partners because the consequences will have mutual ramifications. Boycotting the sale of
oil on the global market will never be in the economic interest of the antagonist. This is first
because of the desire for uninterrupted oil revenue. As President Nixon stated in the summer of
1973, “Oil without a market… doesn’t do a country much good,” and the U.S. is a major
constituent of the market.48 Second, withholding supply to the global oil market is an ineffective
strategy, as an export competitor will eagerly take over the unsatisfied market share. As a result,
an oil weapon is an unreliable means to a political agenda. Consistent supply to the global oil
market—regardless of diplomatic turmoil-- is in the best economic interest of consumers and
exporters alike.

Increased Interdependence
Following the end of the Arab oil embargo in 1974, U.S.-Saudi relations were reinforced
by expanding the partnership’s value to include bilateral trade and investment. Saudi Arabia
profited from the increase in oil prices at the expense of the U.S energy crisis., but this
paradoxically strengthened their alliance. 49 The kingdom’s wealth boom offered profitable
opportunities for U.S. business, trade, and investment. Saudi Arabia also had an increased ability
to fund U.S.-Saudi regional interests, such as their anti-communist missions. 50 The U.S. viewed
Saudi wealth as a compelling opportunity to increase mutual interdependence and use the
kingdom’s financial capabilities to the U.S.-advantage. Saudi Arabia's profusion of wealth and
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increased geopolitical influence convinced the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and
businesses that the U.S. must strengthen its ties. 51 U.S. policymakers recognized the kingdom as
not only the oil market’s swing producer but as a major source of investment capital.
The U.S. foreign policy agenda for increased U.S.-Saudi interdependence to bolster U.S.
economic interests were initiated promptly following the end of OPEC’s oil embargo. In June
1974, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Crown Prince Fahd signed an agreement to
establish two joint commissions: the U.S.-Saudi Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation
(JCEOR) and the US-Saudi Arabian Joint Security Commission (JSCOR).52 Under the
agreement, the U.S. government promised to provide increased economic and military
innovation and aid, including protection from Israel, in exchange for Saudi Arabia agreeing to
exclusively price all of its oil in U.S. dollars. 53 The negotiation for this agreement arrived after
the end of the Bretton Wood gold standard and Nixon’s announcement that the U.S. dollar could
no longer be exchanged for gold. 54 In place of the gold standard, JCEOR established the
petrodollar system to denote the sale of oil in dollars. Any nation that imports Saudi oil is
therefore required to exchange their currency to U.S. dollars before completing the transaction.
The remaining OPEC countries soon followed Saudi Arabia’s petrodollar precedent. U.S.
intentions for the new petrodollar system was to protect the value of and increase the demand for
the U.S dollar, and Saudi Arabia, OPEC, and the world's adoption of the system more than
accomplished this goal. U.S. economic hegemony, global trade position, and monetary base
thrived.

51

McFarland, Oil Powers, 179.

52 Sher, "The 1973 Oil Embargo and US-Saudi Relations: An Episode in New Imperialism."
53 Salameh, “Has the Petrodollar Had

its Day?” 2.

54 Chen, “What You Should Know about Petrodollars.”

Zieff 25
Furthermore, JCEOR offered a great opportunity for the U.S. to work closely with the
Saudis in recycling their vast surplus of petrodollars, such as through investment in US debt
securities.55 The petrodollar system created surpluses of U.S. dollar reserves for oil-exporting
countries, which can be “recycled,” such as through domestic consumption and investment in
U.S. dollar-denominated assets.56 Petrodollar recycling back into the U.S. economy was
extremely beneficial, creating liquidity in financial markets, keeping interest rates low, and
promoting non-inflationary growth.57 The increased demand for U.S. dollars and petrodollar
recycling strengthened the US economy and foreign exchange position. Saudi Arabia equally
benefited from closer political ties and interdependence. JCEOR increased U.S.-Saudi bilateral
trade and investment and aided Saudi’s industrialization and security. 58 In the wake of the oil
embargos, the joint commissions additionally intended to deter Saudi Arabia from undermining
the U.S. in the future.

Lasting U.S. Involvement in The Persian Gulf
The 1970s energy crisis normalized the American perspective that U.S. dependence on
foreign oil leaves the U.S. vulnerable. A few days after the OPEC embargo began, Secretary
Defense James Schlesinger told members of the Nixon administration: “We are moving forces to
the Persian Gulf.” 59 Kissinger thought Schlesinger was insane, and while the military force was
unnecessary then, Schlesinger foresaw the value and the means of force required to secure U.S.
oil interests in the Gulf. 60 By 1978, the Middle East had been challenged by Soviet Union
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expansion for years, including Saudi leaders calling for increased U.S. intervention. However,
the U.S. did not offer military engagement in the Persian Gulf until the 1979 Iranian Revolution
and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. had been concerned with Soviet expansion since
the Cold War, but U.S attention, which was focused elsewhere, was not captured until the
Soviets endangered U.S. oil interests. The U.S. foresaw multiple problems with the Soviet’s
presence in Afghanistan, such as Saudi Arabia’s security, but the most important was the threat
to U.S. hegemony and access to the region’s abundant oil fields. 61
The U.S. militarization of the Persian Gulf had unprecedented support from Washington
and the American public. President Carter announced his position to protect the Gulf from
external threats in his January 1980 State of Union address.62 This policy, which became known
as the Carter Doctrine, prompted the reinvigoration of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, which
is a collection of military units that can be employed to the Middle East on short notice. 63 While
Saudi Arabia would not allow the U.S. to establish a permanent military base within Saudi
territory, the U.S. negotiated with Egypt, Oman, Somalia, and Kenya to construct military bases
for U.S. forces. 64Additionally, the U.S. established a military base in Florida that would become
known as Central Command (CENTCOM) and was solely dedicated to the Middle East. In the
early 1980s, the U.S. had the kingdom protected by a ring of military installations and naval
defense ships. 65
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The U.S. Congress, which demanded defense budget cuts for most of the 1970s,
approved increasing the defense budget to secure Gulf oil. 66 Additionally, the majority of
Americans, and even Democratic leaders, such as the then Senators Ted Kennedy and George
McGovern, proclaimed their support for militarizing the Gulf to protect Saudi Arabia and U.S.
oil interests from the Soviet Union. 67 America’s willingness to evoke the U.S. military,
including traditional critics of U.S. military involvement like McGovern, exemplified right-shift
in the political center. The retired diplomat George F. Kennan noted: “Never since World War II
has there been so far-reaching a militarization of thought and discourse in the capital.” 68 U.S.
energy security was a top foreign policy priority, and the U.S. would use any means necessary to
defend its access to Middle Eastern oil. In 1978, the U.S. and Saudi kingdom were debating a
arms deal to sell the kingdom advanced military weapons and reconnaissance aircrafts to aid
Saudi defense. 69 The unprecedented scale of the arms sale was met with significant American
skepticism, especially from Congress. Yet, the deal was enforced, and its success signaled Saudi
Arabia’s considerable influence over U.S. foreign policy. 70 The Soviet Union collapsed the same
year President Reagan took office in 1981. Although the Soviet threat was neutralized, the
Reagan administration was committed to U.S. military engagement in the Gulf. President Reagan
sustained Carter's oil strategy to defend Saudi Arabia and Gulf reserves and flow of oil through
the region. The U.S. redirected its military focus on the Iran-Iraq war, which had begun in 1980.
The U.S. military would be directly involved in the first and second Gulf Wars, as well as in
numerous special operations missions.
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The enduring U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf exemplifies America’s lasting
scarcity fears caused by the 1973-1974 oil weapon, as well as the influence of oil-is-power
ideology’ in U.S. foreign policy. Hegemony in the Persian Gulf has equally been a means of U.S.
energy security and a projection of global power. The U.S. feared the Soviet Union or another
antagonist power would seek out the region’s oil power and wield it to cut off the West’s oil
supplies or raise prices. The U.S. wanted to keep vast oil revenues away from its adversaries.
Fred Halliday, an international relations and Middle East expert during the Gulf wars, described
the U.S. response as “strategic alarmism” and “arising from the “new mood of raw material
vulnerability.”71 Even after the U.S. regained its oil security, American fear persevered. Halliday
points to this as reminiscent of Marxist’s scarcity syndrome, in which whites have an inescapable
fear of being denied access to raw material. 72 While there is no evidence that the world’s oil
resources cannot be shared and meet human needs, their finite nature perpetuates the myth of
scarcity that incites global competition. As a result, American foreign policy is in a constant
pursuit to control its access to where the material is abundant, which Vitalis describes as
“resource imperialism.”73 Scarcity syndrome conceives that U.S. control of overseas oil fields as
a national imperative, regardless of the reality of supply disruptions.
U.S. hegemony in the Persian Gulf has not insulated the oil market. Oil, like every other
commodity that is traded on the global market, is subject to unpredictable supply disruptions,
natural disasters, and political upheaval, which cannot be mitigated by nations’ foreign policy. 74
The strategic rationale of oil security for political action is pervasive among policymakers and
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military leaders because of its “ready acceptance by the public.” 75 Although the merits of U.S.
strategic rationale of oil for expansion into the Gulf are feeble, oil provided a means to achieve
less agreeable U.S. economic and political interests in the region. American supported U.S.
engagement with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf because of widespread oil dependency fears.
However, Vitalis highlights that there has been no U.S. foreign policy that can confidently be
“shown to have made the price of petroleum more stable than other commodities traded on the
world market.” 76 This includes U.S. policy’s futility in obtaining greater quantities or lower
prices of Arab oil for American refiners. 77 Whether the global oil market would face worse
instability if the U.S. did not intervene is unquantifiable, but regardless, the market and its
complex dynamics cannot be completely safeguarded by policymakers or military forces.

Anti-American Sentiment & 9/11
The U.S.’s military presence in the Persian Gulf fostered increased anti-American
sentiment in the Middle East, especially among Arab nationalists. Critics in the Arab world
condemned the Saudi regime’s relationship with the U.S. as aiding indirect U.S. economic
colonization of the Persian Gulf. 78 In 1976, a Saudi exile, economist, and writer Abdul Rahman
Munif denounced U.S. hegemony and control of oil resources in the Gulf as an “American
method of invasion.” 79 Munif argues the Arab world should liberate itself from U.S. control and
exploitation. 80 In addition to left-wing criticism, Anti-American sentiment escalated
significantly in the 1980s among Islamic extremist groups. Al Qaeda was especially anti-
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American and sought to end U.S. involvement in Saudi Arabia. 81 The U.S. has a long and
complex history of Middle Eastern involvement, and U.S. military expansion in the Gulf was just
one more reason for Al Qaeda’s anti-Americanism and 9/11 attacks.
The United States does not want to upset its relationship with Saudi Arabia, but their
mutual respect and trust have been undermined by the regime’s connection to the 9/11 attacks.
Saudi Arabia’s ultraconservative interpretation of Islam promotes the ideology of extremist
groups like al-Qaeda. 82 Of the 19 Al Qaeda terrorists who hijacked four U.S. commercial
airliners on September 11, 2011, 15 of them were Saudi Arabian citizens, and the leader of Al
Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, was a member of one of Saudi Arabia’s wealthiest families. .83
Immediately following the attack, the FBI evacuated the Bin Laden family and Saudi Royals out
of the U.S., and once safe on Saudi soil, “some of them openly celebrated the attacks.” 84 Saudi
connections to Al Qaeda and 9/11 were suppressed by President George W. Bush’s
administration in 2001, and all condemning evidence discovered by the FBI was hidden.85
The Bush Administration and successive presidents have walked a “diplomatic tightrope”
with Riyadh, and even the 9/11 attacks were not viewed as worth risking its critical Middle East
ally. The U.S. has continued diplomatic relations and sold billions of military arms to the
kingdom to this day.86 Twenty years after 9/11, questions remain regarding Saudi complicity.
Evidence has since become public, implicating senior Saudi officials, including a diplomat in the
Saudi Embassy in Washington, in directly or indirectly assisting the first two Al Qaeda hijackers
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to arrive in the U.S.87 FBI investigation implicated agents of the Saudi government in providing
a support network for the hijackers while they were on U.S. soil. Following a 20-month
investigation, The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission in 2004 concluded that “Saudi Arabia
has long been considered the primary source of Al Qaeda funding, but we have found no
evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded
the organization.” 88 The FBI continued investigations independently for years after the
commission report, collecting more evidence of possible Saudi connection with hijackers, but the
Justice Department had closed the investigation after the 2004 report without pursuing Saudi
charges. The FBI’s findings were revisited in 2015 by a federal commission, but the new
materials were deemed insufficient to change the 9/11 Commission’s original findings.
Since 1945, the U.S. has granted the regime a multitude of ‘free passes’ for its human
rights violations in exchange for the value of having Saudi Arabia as a close ally. This type of
foreign policy is also known as “realpolitik” and the U.S. has tacitly evoked this logic over the
years to justify the perseverance of its relationship with Saudi Arabia, despite the kingdom’s
unjust behavior. However, the attacks of 9/11 exemplify the extent of the U.S. government’s
reluctance to hold Saudi Arabia accountable, even for transgression committed on U.S. soil. This
far-reaching application of realpolitik exemplifies the influence of oil security and Saudi Arabia
over U.S. foreign policy.

Chapter I: Analysis & Conclusion
Oil is the number one resource responsible for the world’s energy security, globalization,
economic development, and social welfare. Consequently, the geopolitics of oil takes center
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stage in international relations. Furthermore, access to oil is the source of rivalry, competition,
and overall conflict among nations. Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are
predisposed with vast oil reserves and therefore possess influence over the global oil market and
world’s energy security. With the special status of swing producer, Saudi Arabia has an
especially powerful position in the geopolitical system, which Al Saud exemplified through
political weaponization of oil in 1973. While the oil weapon had minimal direct effectivity on
U.S. energy security, its employment and mere possession wielded immense psychological
influence over the U.S. The oil weapon set the precedent of restricting oil access and threatening
nations’ energy security for a political agenda. Even though poor U.S. energy policy and demand
were equally if not mostly responsible for the U.S. energy crisis than the Arab embargo, U.S.
overseas dependency fears were a very pervasive and physical manifestation of the oil weapon.
In the 1970s however, the industrialized U.S. economy was faced with raw material
vulnerability, inciting an aggressive oil strategy. Saudi Arabia and OPEC’s employment of the
oil weapon for political blackmail against the U.S. resulted in significant and long-lasting
psychological trauma that affected American sense of energy security and dependency on
overseas oil. While the oil weapon was just one of many causes of the U.S. energy crisis,
Washington looked overseas rather than domestically to assure its future oil security. The U.S.
felt vulnerable to Saudi Arabia and OPEC’s influence over U.S. foreign policy. The U.S., as the
number one world superpower, resented Saudi Arabia’s power to influence whether the U.S.
supports Israel during the October War. The political influence and oil weapon Saudi Arabia
wielded with its swing producer role exposed the weakness of the U.S.’s energy security. The
U.S. is ingrained with a deep-rooted fear of resource scarcity, and while the U.S. economy and
oil security recovered shortly after the end of the oil embargos, the U.S. sought further security.
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The oil embargos exemplified that U.S.-Saudi relations were insufficient to protect U.S. energy
security, and consequently, the U.S. has pursued further protections of its oil access. The U.S.
has safeguarded oil access through increasing U.S-Saudi interdependence and U.S. expansion
into the Persian Gulf. These strategies have balanced U.S. vulnerability to oil dependency by
developing Saudi Arabian dependency on U.S. economic and security relations.
U.S. expansion into the Persian Gulf expanded the value of the U.S.-Saudi partnership
beyond access to oil to include American economic and political interests. Increased U.S.-Saudi
engagement through economic relations and U.S. military build-up expanded the 1945
agreement of an oil for security exchange. In addition to protecting U.S. access to oil and
minimizing disruptions to the global oil market, U.S. economic interdependence with Saudi
Arabia bolstered the U.S. economy. Saudi Arabia’s surge of wealth from oil revenue incited
increased investment and trade with the U.S., especially through petrodollar recycling, which
benefits the U.S. economy to this day.
Additionally, the U.S. military buildup in the Gulf projected U.S. hegemony and
geopolitical influence in the region. The U.S. supervises and protects the region’s oil, market
stability, and consequently the world’s energy security. As a result, the U.S. restricts eager rivals
from gaining control over the region, its oil, and competing with U.S. hegemony. Additionally,
U.S. presence in the Gulf defends Saudi Arabia from external threats, and in exchange, the
kingdom helps execute U.S. foreign agenda, such as regional stability and counterterrorism. As a
result, U.S.-Saudi's elevated engagement promotes the U.S.’s energy security, economic growth,
and geopolitical prowess.
The development in U.S.-Saudi relations and U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf
presents drawbacks in addition to benefits. The U.S. was determined to use all means necessary
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to secure its energy security, but significant consequences of its determination have become
increasingly worrisome in the 21st century. The predominant response in the Arab world was
increased anti-American sentiment. The U.S. has a long complex history of military engagement
in the Middle East, including assassinations, coup attempts, and torture, and support for
repressive regimes. Consequently, U.S. expansion into the Persian Gulf was met with extreme
suspicion and criticism from the Arab world.
The U.S.’s Middle Eastern oil agenda compromises its national security, especially in
regards to Islamic extremists and terrorist groups. Al Qaeda was infuriated with the U.S. military
presence in the region, which added motive toward committing the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The
attacks highlighted the cost of increased U.S. engagement with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, as
well as increased anti-Arab sentiment among Americans. In response to the attacks, the U.S.
initiated The War on Terror and investigated Saudi connections to Al Qaeda. However, without
overt evidence of Saudi regime endorsement, the U.S. was quick to conclude the military
campaign against terrorism would not involve threatening the kingdom. Since the 1970s energy
crisis, the U.S. is on a diplomatic tightrope with Saudi Arabia, and Washington decides that
protecting U.S. energy security, as well as the economic and political rewards of U.S.-Saudi
relations, is of greater strategic importance than the drawbacks to Saudi accountability and U.S.
national security.
Chapter II: The Unconventional Shale Revolution’s Threat to Saudi Arabia’s Stability
Introduction
Shale oil revolutionized the outlook of U.S. energy security, while deteriorating Saudi
Arabia’s oil-dependent stability. American innovation in hydraulic fracking to extract oil from
shale rock multiplies the U.S.’s domestic oil resources beyond conventional oil fields. Shale oil
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minimizes scarcity fears that have plagued U.S. foreign policy since the 1970s. However, the
U.S. shale oil produces a disequilibrium in the global oil market and imperils Saudi Arabia’s oildependent economy. As a petrostate, the kingdom relies extensively on externally generated oil
revenue for domestic stability, as well as to promote regional stability and global energy
security.89
Chapter II begins with a historical background on the U.S. shale revolution to
contextualize shale oil’s implications to the global oil market and the threat to Saudi Arabia. U.S.
shale oil disrupts the market and undermines the oil revenue of oil-exporters, which especially
imperils oil-revenue dependent nations (petrostates), like Saudi Arabia. Next, the paper evaluates
shale’s threat to the kingdom’s domestic sphere with an emphasis on political stability, economic
security, and public welfare. Following the perils of internal stability, shale’s threat to Saudi
Arabia’s external stability is evaluated. A historical background on Saudi Arabia’s role in the
Middle East’s balance of power and the global oil market establishes vital context for the threats
facing the kingdom’s enduring role as a regionally constructive force and swing producer. Shale
oil’s infliction on Saudi oil revenue not only impedes the kingdom’s internal stabilization
capabilities but also those directed externally. Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical power and swing
producer role influence regional politics and mitigate disruptions to peace and the global oil
market. The depletion of Saudi oil revenue due to shale and its market impacts are impeding the
kingdom’s financial capabilities to pursue regional and market interests, which additionally
jeopardizes the region’s peace and the world’s energy security. After a comprehensive discussion
on shale’s threat to Saudi Arabia’s internal and external stability, shale’s backlash on the U.S. is
briefly discussed as a consequence of shale’s impact on the global oil market. Moreover, the
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backlash of shale highlights a nations’ inability to insulate their oil industries and energy security
from disruptions in the interconnected market. Lastly, the conclusion of Chapter II emphasizes
the imperil of Saudi Arabia’s stability and enduring role in the preservation of the region’s
balance of power and oil market. As long as Saudi Arabia remains oil-dependent, and shale
continues to present a surplus to the market, the threat of shale will likely grow increasingly dire
for the kingdom.

Historical Background: The U.S. Shale Revolution
In 2003, American energy security was fettered to a quickly diminishing domestic oil
supply. The U.S. was running out of oil and was looking towards Saudi Arabia and the Persian
Gulf to make up for the shortfall. At the same time, the Devon Oil Corporation, founded by John
and Larry Nichols, successfully innovated a new technology of slickwater fracturing combined
with horizontal drilling to release natural gas from shale rock— hydraulic fracking.90 The surge
of natural gas production was nicknamed the “shale gale.” 91 While the U.S. natural gas industry
was booming, oil remained scarce. That is until 2007 when Mark Papa, the CEO of EOG (one of
the leading independents in the Barnett Shale), proposed the idea to translate hydraulic fracking
of shale rock to extract oil instead of natural gas. 92 EOG began drilling in the Eagle Ford in
south Texas, and other oil companies rushed to follow in their steps. By 2014, EOG was the
number one onshore crude oil producer in the U.S. 93 The successful extraction of shale oil
evolves the “Shale Gale” nickname to become “Shale Gale Goes Oily.” 94 The technological
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innovations in hydraulic fracturing established a new source of oil, launching the U.S. shale
revolution.
Shale oil was a U.S. gamechanger, boosting the size of U.S. oil reserves beyond the
drying-up conventional oil fields. Oil production rocketed and liberated the U.S. from relying on
the global oil market for its energy security. The vast new oil supplies made the U.S. practically
self-sufficient in meeting consumer demands, which principally entrusts U.S. energy security to
American oil producers. Furthermore, the new oil production fueled America’s manufacturing
revival, economic activity, and the domestic circulation of money. 95 Especially following the
2008 recession, this surge provided a much-needed boost to the U.S. economic recovery. Ben
Bernanke, who is the retired chairman of the Federal Reserve as of 2014, claimed that the
discovery of shale oil was "one of… if not the most beneficial development” in the U.S.
economy since the Great Recession.96 Between the end of the Recession in 2009 and 2019, the
shale revolution accounted for 40% of the U.S.’s overall growth in domestic industrial
production, supported over 2.8 million jobs, generated much federal and state revenue, and
reduced trade deficits.97
The shale revolution boosted the U.S. trade position and status as a net oil exporter,
although falling short of Saudi Arabia’s swing producer capabilities. The U.S. briefly becomes
the number one producer and exporter of oil in 2018, surpassing the reigning oil kingdom, Saudi
Arabia. While Saudi Arabia rather efficiently reclaimed its number-one status, the U.S. continues
to challenge the kingdom’s market share. Despite presenting competition in the global oil
market, the U.S. is unequipped to take over Saudi’s swing producer role, dominantly because the
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U.S. is by no means a low-cost producer. The cost of producing most U.S. tight oil, which is the
type of oil found in shale rock, is around $80 per barrel, 98 while Saudi Arabian production of
conventional oil production costs around $4-$5 per barrel.99 Additionally, the U.S. does not
match Saudi’s abundant spare capacity. U.S. oil production has approximately 0.23 million
barrels per day (MBD) of spare capacity compared to Saudi Arabia’s 1.5-2 MBD.100 The U.S.
has neither the spare capacity, low-cost production, nor output flexibilities that secure Saudi
Arabia’s role as swing producer.
While the shale revolution drives U.S. economic prosperity, shale oil poses disruption to
the global oil market. Historically, the petroleum industry and security experts have focused their
attention on the global depletion of oil, but following the shale revolution, the global oil surplus
and the plateau of consumption become more pertinent concerns. Maugeri affirms that, in 2012,
the world is nowhere near reaching peak oil production. Rather, the world’s supply capacity is
growing at unprecedented levels, signaling an impending peak demand and a fall in oil prices in
the oil market.101
U.S. shale in the global oil market calls for Saudi Arabia’s swing production capabilities
to balance the surplus. However, balancing supply and demand would require the kingdom to
restrict a significant portion of its oil exports to make room for U.S. shale, and consequently lose
the dominant source of Saudi revenue. Despite Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil revenue and
vulnerability to market fluctuations, the kingdom publicly renounces any concern over U.S. shale
oil. MBS and Saudi oil minister, Khalid al-Falih, told U.S. news sources on multiple occasions
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that they are unconcerned with the effects of shale oil on the kingdom and its budget. Al-Falih
hypothesizes an impending shortage of shale oil by the end of the decade. 102 Regardless of
whether the shale oil industry crashes, the global oil market’s supply surplus and sinking prices
are restricting the kingdom’s ability to leverage oil wealth for domestic and regional stability.
Figure 2: Shale’s Threat to Saudi Arabia Oil Revenue & Oil Exports. 103

Shale’s Threat to Saudi Arabia’s Internal Stability
As a petrostate, Saudi Arabia is dependent on oil rents to maintain domestic stability. The
kingdom’s stability is not an easy feat, as like most petrostates, Saudi Arabia suffers from serious
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economic, political, and social challenges arising from its government-dominated and oildependent system. Scholars describe the phenomenon of petrostate’s domestic instability as a
result of the “resource curse.”104 Petrostates like Saudi Arabia are in a unique position of extreme
wealth but extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the global oil industry. Saudi Arabia’s
economy is specialized to the production of oil, which provides sufficient revenue in the market
to support the government and social welfare. Saudi Arabia is “a nation of entitlements”
governed by a rentier system that uses oil rents, instead of taxation, to pay for social services. 105
Rentierism is a social contract, and in exchange for free social provisions and no taxation, the
populace relinquishes its representation and influence over policies and government decisions. 106
As a result, Al Saud is less responsive to its citizens and wields oil funds to pacify or repress the
populace.107 During the Arab Spring, which was a series of pro-democracy uprisings that gained
steam across the Middle East in the Spring of 2011, Saudi Arabian citizens capitalized on this
opportunity to protest the kingdom’s domestic oppression, political corruption, religious
intolerance, substantial economic disparity, high unemployment-- to name a few.108 The
heightened demand for political reform within the kingdom revealed the Saudi population’s
pervasive disgruntlement concerning the kingdom’s governance and poor economic policy.
The Saudi regime relied on rentierism and oil revenue to alleviate dissent. The kingdom
increased capital and social benefits to the population. In February and March of 2011, King
Abdallah announced a $130 billion financial package in the form of a variety of social and
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economic benefits. 109 This economic package helped peacefully pacify the population’s demands
for change and mask their contention toward Al Saud. However, in addition to financial
incentives to stop public dissent, the Saudi regime uses oil revenue to fund physical and
intimidation campaigns to suppress opposition. Saudi security forces were deployed to potential
protest locations and responded violently to any demonstrations. 110 The Saudi regime used oilfunded policing campaigns and U.S. military weapons to suppress counter revolutionary
movements, as well as seeking support from Saudi’s Islamic religious establishment. The
kingdom presented Islamic institutions with an alluring financial package to form a religiouspolitical counter revolutionary alliance. 111 The Council of Senior Religious Scholars, the
country’s supreme religious institution, denounced the demonstrations and criticism against the
royal family as un-Islamic.112 Any open dissent against Al Sad and challenges to Wahhabism, the
dominant interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia, was faced with harsh consequences. The
religious police led a violent counterrevolutionary campaign against Arab nationalism, leftist
ideologies, and any threats to the unity of the Muslim community. 113 The endeavors of Saudi’s
Islamic institutions and religious police, just like the kingdom’s financial packages, were fully
funded by oil revenue, and through all means of oppression, Al Saudi survived and sustained
political legitimacy through the Arab Spring. Saudi Arabia’s strategy for maintaining Al Saud’s
political power and suppressing public dissent exemplify that the kingdom’s political and social
stability rely on oil revenue.
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Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s economy is dependent on the oil industry and oil revenue.
The kingdom ties its economic stability, as well as its energy security, with oil abundance, but
the competition of shale in the global market forces the kingdom to re-evaluate the vitality of its
dependence on oil. The Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE) organization published an
Oil Security Index report in 2013 that developed a comparable and quantitative measure of oil
security. The Index uses three aspects of oil security: dependency of a country’s economy on oil,
economic exposure to oil price and price change, and the security of oil supplies. 114 The report
determined that Saudi Arabia’s high oil intensity (volume of oil consumed per unit of GDP),
rising domestic energy use, and fiscal reliance on oil make it very vulnerable to changing oil
prices. 115 The oil intensity of the kingdom’s economy, which is one of the most meaningful
measurements of the structural importance of oil, and the average fuel use per capita are high and
rising.116
In recent years, Saudi Arabia’s economy has already been hit by U.S. shale. Shale oil
imposes a surplus in the global oil market, crashing oil prices, increasing competition for Saudi’s
market share, and fueling Saudi budget deficits-- all of which imperil the kingdom’s oil-funded
stability. During the oil price collapse of 2014, Saudi oil revenue fell from 321 billion in 2013 to
136 billion in 2016.117 Saudi Arabia’s revenue was significantly short of satisfying its target and
budget needs.118 In 2016, the government cut energy subsidies and raised the prices of water,
electricity, gasoline, and ethane. 119 Price increases on domestic resources, although minimal,
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exemplify the kingdom’s financial strain. 120 As Saudi Arabia lacks economic diversification, the
financial burden of social resources and distribution of rents relies on oil revenue. Shale’s
undercut to Saudi oil revenue jeopardizes Saudi Arabia’s “buying power” to continue financing
the rentier social contract, its promised financial welfare packages, and anti-dissent campaign.121
While the kingdom surmounted the widespread turmoil emanating from the Arab Spring, the
underlying political, economic, and social problems remain. Saudi Arabia’s stability is
contingent on consistent and abundant oil revenue, which is highly vulnerable to shale’s
implications on the global oil market.

Historical Background: Saudi Arabia’s Role in the Middle East’s Balance of Power &
Global Oil Market
The threat of shale transcends the kingdom’s borders, and its implications undermine the
global oil market and Saudi constructive role in the Middle East. The Middle East is a
tumultuous region, which adheres to international relation’s realist assessment of the world's
anarchical system as a constant struggle. 122 With no central authority for conflict mitigation and
governance, Middle Eastern nations constantly compete for survival, power, and the region’s
energy resources, and, as a result, Saudi Arabia faces a myriad of external threats. According to
the foundation of the U.S-Saudi alliance, the U.S. promised the kingdom military support. Saudi
Arabia’s national security is strongly tied to the U.S., which is anchored by long-standing
military training programs, weapons sales, and defense cooperation. 123 The U.S. aids the
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kingdom’s threats against neighboring and regional threats, as well as strengthen the kingdom’s
position of power in the Middle East.
U.S. hegemony helps supervise the Middle East’s anarchical IR system and promote a
balance of power. In May of 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), was established in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as a political and economic alliance to contribute to regional security and
stability. The GCC was formed in response to regional threats, such as the growing assertiveness
of Iran. 124 The U.S. and the GCC members work as a constructive force to subdue any
antagonist from gaining excessive power that will disrupt Middle Eastern stability. 125
As the Middle East holds the majority of the world’s known oil reserves, the region’s
balance of power is inextricably linked to the global oil market. The Middle East’s stability,
especially the consistent production and flow of oil through the Persian Gulf, sustains the global
oil market. Likewise, disruptions to the region’s stability jeopardize the stability of the market.
Regardless of shale, Saudi Arabia and OPEC are the major contributors to the global oil market
and guarantors of the world’s energy security. Saudi Arabia, as a swing producer, fosters
stability in the region and in the global oil market, which endorse the kingdom’s consistent oil
revenue. Saudi Arabia has a significant responsibility to protect market stability, regardless of
internal and external threats. Political instability is prominent in the Middle East, and Saudi
Arabia is one of the few countries that have a sufficiently stable regime that can govern its
territory and exert some influence in the region. 126 The kingdom’s position in the Middle East’s
balance of power is bolstered by the U.S., restricting other oil-producing or imperialistic nations
from gaining a monopolization of power. Next to Saudi Arabia, Iran is the second-largest oil
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producer in the middle east.127 Yet if Iran were to dominate the region, the unpredictable and
radical regime could cause disruptions to the vast energy supplies that flow through the Persian
Gulf. The ensuing consequences on the global oil market would threaten the world’s energy
security.
Shale’s Threat to Saudi Arabia’s External Stability
As I discussed in the historical background above, Saudi Arabia is highly invested in
maintaining the Middle East’s balance of power and the stability of the global oil market, as both
are reliable for the kingdom’s oil revenue. External instability undermines Saudi Arabia’s
national security and stability and therefore the kingdom has long embraced the self-ascribed
role as “regional coordinator” and intra-Arab consensus-builder. 128 Akin to Saudi Arabia’s
means of addressing internal instability, the kingdom wields oil revenue to address external
instability. Oil revenue positions Saudi Arabia as a powerful ally, which the kingdom
exemplifies through engagement to counter regional revolutionary movements during the Arab
Spring. Saudi Arabia, embracing its constructive regional role, utilized proactive diplomacy and
vast financial aid to reinstate Middle Eastern stability.129 Saudi Arabia feared neighboring
revolutions would leave a power vacuum, and the kingdom intended to guide political outcomes,
such as restricting the rising Muslim Brotherhood, from gaining power and disrupting the
region’s peace. The Muslim Brotherhood promotes a political Islam alternative to Saudi Arabia’s
traditional Wahhabism that rejects secularism and promotes democracy, and Saudi Arabia views
this ideology as a threat to Al Saud’s monarchical rule and political legitimacy. 130 In Egypt,
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which is one of Saudi Arabia’s strongest allies, the Arab Spring revolution replaced President
Hosni Mubarak with a Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi. 131 Saudi Arabia
promptly aided a military coup to overthrow Morsi and crackdown on the Brotherhood. Other
pro-democracy movements, such as in Bahrain and Iran, persisted to agitate the region, and
Saudi Arabia once again sought to subdue these threats. 132 As a 1976 CIA report noted, “the
Saudi weapon is money,” and oil was the kingdom’s most valuable revenue source in preventing
the Arab Spring’s disruptive ripples from disturbing Saudi and regional stability.133

Chapter II: Analysis & Conclusion
The U.S. shale revolution poses significant geopolitical consequences to conventional oilproducing nations, the Middle East’s balance of power, and the global oil market. U.S. shale oil
has already disrupted the global oil market, and while shale oil extraction is monopolized by the
U.S. and Canada, shale oil is globally abundant. Several nations, including Russia and China, are
currently assessing and testing shale oil extraction in their countries. 134 The world’s recoverable
oil resources are far greater than what was accessible through conventional oil fields alone, and
consequently, the global oil market is facing a significant supply surplus. In 2021, oil production
is already rising at an unprecedented level, and supply in the global oil market is outpacing
demand and consumption. Oil-producing nations are maintaining levels of production above
demand to sustain their oil revenue in the midst of low prices, but, as a result, oil prices are
declining even further. The crash of oil prices has raised the global debate over the future of the
world’s oil market and industries. The surge in U.S. shale oil production increases the market
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supply, while demand cannot match. Demand is highly fluctuant to numerous factors, but the
world’s COVID-19 pandemic and clean energy initiatives contribute to consumption reduction.
In contrast to pervasive scarcity and peak-supply fears, the world is now debating whether
consumption has reached peak, and if not, how long until consumption rates flatten and then
drop.135
A crash in oil prices is detrimental to all oil-exporting nations, and in the case of Saudi
Arabia, the kingdom’s stability is seriously threatened. The Saudi regime leverages its oil wealth
to alleviate internal dissent and maintain political control amid its abundant domestic problems.
The kingdom’s rentier system and financial incentives are the dominant means to prevent a
public uprising, and shale threatens the regime’s financial ability to counter dissent. Furthermore,
shale’s undermining of Saudi oil revenue threatens the kingdom’s ability to sustain public
welfare, but also the kingdom’s entire economy. The curse of natural resource-dominated
economies is the nation’s dependency on that resource, which includes a lack of alternative
industries. Saudi Arabia does not have the economic diversification to fall back on in the cases of
a price collapse in the global oil market and falling consumption rates. Saudi Arabia’s economy
and the dominant source of government revenue are vulnerable to the same source that fuels the
kingdom-- the global oil market.
In addition to Saudi Arabia’s internal stability, shale’s surplus and crash of prices in the
oil market jeopardize the kingdom’s swing producer capabilities. As a swing producer, Saudi
Arabia maintains its role as regional coordinator, especially within OPEC. Saudi Arabia’s swing
producer role includes the manipulation of oil production to balance supply with demand in the
global oil market. However, the kingdom cannot sustain an extended hold on oil exports without
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seriously undermining its oil revenue, and consequently, national stability. Even with Saudi
Arabia’s continued oil production, low prices place the kingdom in a near equally precarious
financial condition with the regime running a budget deficit.
Furthermore, low oil prices further restrict the kingdom’s financial ability to address the
region’s external threats. Saudi Arabia’s oil revenue is a political means to fulfill regional
interests, such as promoting the Middle East’s balance of power. A peaceful Middle East
minimizes disruptions to the global oil market and fosters stable and profitable market prices for
consistent oil revenue. Therefore, shale is not only threatening Saudi Arabia’s stability, but also
the kingdom’s role in the stability of the Middle East’s balance of power and global oil market.
All these threats present vital considerations for Chapter III’s re-evaluation of U.S.
strategic interest in U.S.-Saudi relations and Middle Eastern engagement. While shale oil is the
U.S.’s innovation, the effects on Saudi Arabia, the Middle East, and the global oil market are not
completely aligned with U.S. interests. The threats highlight U.S. stakes in the region and the
consequence of the U.S.’s strategic divergence from a traditional supportive and stabilizing role.
Additionally, the threat of shale and the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia may increase the
kingdom’s dependence and value of U.S. relations, as well as incline MBS to be increasingly
open to U.S. demands for U.S.-Saudi relations reform.

Chapter III: Increased U.S. Energy Independence and Re-evaluation of the U.S.-Saudi
Arabia Relationship
Introduction
Increased U.S. energy independence liberates American energy security from overseas oil
dependency and incites a nationwide debate over the enduring value of U.S.-Saudi relations. The
success of shale oil extraction expands known U.S. oil reserves beyond conventional oil fields.
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The U.S. foreign policy gains autonomy from Saudi Arabian and Middle Eastern oil. Increased
U.S. energy independence launches American policymakers into a reevaluation of the value of
U.S.-Saudi relations. Chapter III begins with a historical background of U.S. energy
independence to provide context for why so many Americans waited until the shale revolution to
contend and argue for a drastic change in U.S.-Saudi relations. This background is followed by
an extensive evaluation of the origins of the debate, including U.S. and Saudi kingdom
perspectives over the ideal direction of relations. First, Saudi Arabia’s stance on the future of
U.S.-Saudi relations is evaluated. As Saudi Arabia has to-date raised no overt dissatisfaction nor
calls for change within U.S.-Saudi relations, the paper infers the kingdom’s support for
maintaining current relations based on Al Saud’s national interests.
Following Saudi Arabia’s stance, the U.S.’s two pervasive perspectives are discussed.
First, U.S. arguments for American disengagement with Saudi Arabia and the Middle East are
evaluated with a focus on U.S. energy independence, Saudi Arabia’s human rights violations,
U.S. excessive military spending, and unreliable economic relations. Anti-engagement advocates
argue the value proposition of continuing U.S.-Saudi relations and Middle Eastern involvement
is weak, and therefore, the U.S. should promptly disengage from the region. While the level of
U.S. disengagement is unclear, the spectrum ranges from the extreme-- a complete divorce of
U.S.-Saudi economic, political, and military relations to a lesser extreme that includes the
dissolution of one or more areas. The major arguments for U.S. disengagement will be discussed
in depth, followed by an appraisal of the arguments' merits.
The second dominant U.S. argument contends that the U.S. should preserve U.S.-Saudi
relations but alongside a conditional foreign policy reform. Pro-engagement arguments
emphasize the importance of protecting the region’s balance of power and interconnected global
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oil market, as well U.S. political, security, and economic interests. Advocates for maintaining
engagement highlight the detrimental consequences of disengagement on the world, such as a
Middle Eastern power vacuum, disruption to the global oil market and energy security, and
unrestrained terrorism. Additionally, pro-engagement arguments emphasize U.S.-specific
ramifications of disengagement, such as the end of the petrodollar systems and economic
devastation. The pro-arguments address the concerns of anti-engagement arguments by
proposing that sustained U.S.-Saudi relations will be contingent on the partnership’s reform.
Progressive U.S. foreign policy will enforce expectations and guardrails that will rebalance
relations and reel in Saudi behavior. The pro-engagement discussion will conclude with an
extensive analysis that includes a comparative evaluation of the two U.S. arguments.

Historical Background: U.S. Energy Independence
The U.S. has reached an unprecedented degree of energy independence. Since the 2006 shale
revolution, U.S. domestic oil production has risen from 8.9 million barrels per day (MMb/d) in
2000 to 18.4 MMb/d in 2020.136 For the first time in the pre-world war era, U.S. oil production is
meeting domestic consumption, and the U.S has become a net annual petroleum exporter. As a
result, the U.S.’s total overseas oil imports have nearly been cut in half.137 The U.S. is less reliant
on overseas imports from its Middle Eastern allies for their energy security. While OPEC and the
Persian Gulf have long been the dominant source of U.S. oil imports; today, Canada is the source
of 52% of total U.S. oil imports, while Saudi Arabia only provides 7%. 138 According to the
revolutionary meeting between President Roosevelt and King ibn Saud following World War II,
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the U.S.-Saudi alliance was founded on an exchange of oil for security. Yet U.S. imports from
the Middle East never accounted for more than 15% of the U.S. oil supply. 139 As Vitalis argues,
the U.S. dependency on Saudi Arabian oil is a myth, which the shale revolution further dispels.
As a result, the U.S. foreign-policy community is progressively debating Saudi Arabia’s value
proposition as an ally and reconsidering the U.S.’s strategic interest in enduring relations.
Figure 3: Increased U.S. Energy Independence Following the 2006 Shale Revolution. 140

U.S. & Saudi Arabia: Origins of The Debate
Since 1945, the special relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has withstood
profound political divergences, traumatic events, and uncertainties. Both countries have reasons
for dissatisfaction with the other over the decades, but these issues have been routinely

139 Luft and Korin, “The Myth of U.S. Energy Dependence.”
140

“Oil and Petroleum Products Explained,” U.S. Energy Information Administration.

Zieff 52
rationalized or overlooked in favor of U.S.-Saudi Arabia’s mutually beneficial interdependence.
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. each use the other for a variety of benefits, but the drawbacks are a
growing concern for the U.S. in particular. The foreign policy of the U.S. and Saudi regime have
evolved significantly since the foundation of their alliance. The widening divergence between
both nations’ foreign policy and domestic agendas has made it more difficult to align strategic
interests, as well as to evoke realpolitik justifications for discontent.
In the U.S., political rumblings over the state of U.S.-Saudi relations have become more
and more assertive. Events perpetrated by the Saudi Regime in recent years, including military
campaigns, human rights abuses, and international law violations, have raised the demand for a
change in U.S.-Saudi relations to the forefront of America’s foreign policy agenda. The U.S. is
exhausted from engaging in the Persian Gulf’s relentless conflict and constantly extending
latitude for Saudi Arabia’s provocative actions. Saudi Arabia is a high-maintenance ally, and the
U.S. shale revolution presents an alluring opportunity for political, economic, and military relief
from Saudi involvement. U.S. policymakers are urging for a “course correction” in U.S.-Saudi
relations, but this agenda has yet to manifest in any particular shape or form. 141 The two primary
opposing perspectives on the U.S.’s future in the region are to reduce involvement (to varying
degrees) or maintain involvement in unison with a progressive reform.
In contrast to the U.S., Saudi Arabia has not vocalized a desire to change U.S.-Saudi
relations, and therefore, the Saudi perspective is inferred from its national interests and political
behavior. Currently, the regime is undertaking significant societal and leadership changes. Since
Prince Mohammad bin Salam became the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia in 2017, the kingdom
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has transformed from a status quo power to a disruptive force. 142 Traditionally, the kingdom
shared U.S. values of stability in the Middle East and protected the region from challengers to
the region’s balance of power. 143 However, MBS has reconstructed Saudi Arabia’s domestic and
foreign policies with an increasingly assertive and ambitious approach to international relations.
144

Under MBS’s rule, the kingdom’s behavior displays a pattern of recklessness and subversion

towards U.S. interests. 145 The war in Yemen is just one example of MBS’s failed and dangerous
foreign policy initiatives. The Yemen War, which the United Nations deems the world’s worst
humanitarian crisis, underscores Saudi Arabia’s disregard for national security, which is critical
to the kingdom’s leadership role in promoting the stability of the Middle East’s balance of power
and global oil market. In addition to the war’s fundamental opposition to U.S. interests of
stability and human rights, the crisis places further pressure on the U.S. to support the kingdom’s
security.
Solely looking at MBS’s domestic reforms, his new policies align with U.S. values and
objectives. MBS disempowered the kingdom’s religious institution, relaxed constraints on social
life, and has set plans to diversify the economy away from oil dependence. These examples of
domestic policy initiatives align with U.S. interests and create the opportunity for increased
economic interdependence. 146 Yet, the perks of these domestic policy changes are difficult for
the U.S. to appreciate in the shadow of MBS’s reckless foreign policy. The Middle East is a
tumultuous region, and Saudi Arabia has historically played a stabilizing force in the region.
However, in order to meet these expectations, Saudi Arabia must firstly be domestically stable,
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which MBS has not instilled confidence in. Consequently, the future of U.S.-Saudi relations,
including the direction of a possible alliance reform, remains in the realm of uncertainty.
The U.S. increased energy independence and exhaustion from Saudi Arabia, in
conjunction with the kingdom’s increasingly assertive and reckless international behavior, render
the need for a large-scale change. Given this, the future of U.S.-Saudi relations is increasingly
debated by the U.S. and Saudi policymakers and scholars. Chapter 3 will evaluate the
perspective of Al Saud, Saudi citizens, the U.S. government, and American citizens.
Saudi Arabia’s Stance on Future U.S. Relations
Al Saud has economic and security motivation to maintain current relations with the
United States. Saudi Arabia is facing a myriad of threats to its domestic stability, which are
detailed in my discussion of shale’s threats to the kingdom. Saudi Arabia’s internal threats,
including public dissent and budget deficits, and regional threats, including Iran and Islamist
extremists, all present rationale for Al Saud preserving U.S. relations. Stabilization and
counterterrorism have been a common directive for U.S.-Saudi relations, and the U.S. military is
a vital means to promote regional peace.
. U.S. policy initiatives have long sought to help the kingdom address economic
challenges, and with Saudi’s economic vulnerability to shale and the impending peak demand in
the oil industry, the kingdom will need assistance in transforming its economy away from oildependency. Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salam has implemented a Vision 2030 plan to
prepare for a Saudi Arabia beyond the oil era. 147 The plan seeks to make structural changes to the
kingdom’s economy, through privatization and diversification, to foster economic growth
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beyond the oil industry. As the U.S. has the largest economy in the world and is one of Saudi
Arabia’s top trading partners, U.S.-Saudi economic interdependence will be vital to the
kingdom’s economic development. Additionally, the U.S. may be drawn upon to provide
investment, capital, and advice during the kingdom’s economic transformation.
The kingdom and the U.S. share many goals, and differences in their strategic visions do
not negate the effectiveness of their cooperation. In response to American arguments for U.S.
disengagement from Saudi Arabia resulting from Mohammad bin Salam’s human right
violations and aggressive foreign policy, MBS argues these critiques hold little import. MBS
explains that Saudi’s human rights and military behavior is a minute detail in their productive
and worthwhile relationship. In a 2018 interview with Bloomberg, Mohammad Bin Salam said,
“If you look at the picture overall, you have 99 percent of good things and one bad issue.” 148
Mohammad points to their joint effort in fighting terrorism in Iraq and Syria and their
achievements with investment and trade. 149 Additionally, Khaled al-Malik, who is the editor-inchief of the Saudi newspaper, Al Jazirah, responds to U.S. criticism of the kingdom’s human
rights practices in 2021, writing that “America does not have the right to bully a strategic
regional ally and it is not in its interest to let domestic differences harm its regional interests and
those of its partners.”150 The U.S. must accept its ally’s occasional unlawful and unethical
behavior or risk jeopardizing U.S.-Saudi interests.
During historic moments of particular diplomatic strain, such as the 1973 oil embargo,
Saudi Arabia has warned that the U.S. can be easily replaced by another world power. While the
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kingdom can find a new powerful partner, such as China or Russia, this transition is Saudi
Arabia’s ideal choice. Khaled al-Malik claims, “the kingdom prefers America due to their
historic and strategic ties and common goals.” 151 The kingdom additionally values U.S.-Saudi
shared Middle Eastern interests, as well as the U.S.’s political influence and globally dominant
economy and military. Saudi Arabia needs a “great-power protector” to support its national
security, stability, and economic development, and, arguably, the kingdom needs U.S. support
more than ever.152 Historically, the kingdom wields its oil revenues to address domestic and
regional threats, but Saudi oil revenue is suffering under the poor conditions of the global oil
market, and consequently the kingdom is more reliant on U.S. economic and security support.

U.S.’s Stance on Saudi Relations: Reduce Involvement Arguments
Introduction
The future of U.S-Saudi relations is imperiled by American arguments to fundamentally
reduce, if not end, the seven-decade alliance. Amid growing anti-Saudi sentiment in the U.S.,
Washington has a generally accepted perception of U.S.-Saudi relations as a transactional
partnership—not an alliance.153 Since Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks, American anti-Saudi sentiment
has erupted and has further been enforced by each of the kingdom’s ensuing human rights
violations and aggressive foreign policy. The shale revolution and increased U.S. energy security
have moreover intensified the evaluation of U.S.-Saudi relations as not worth it. Yet, regardless
of this sentiment, every U.S. president has maintained personal relations with the reigning Saudi
monarch. Washington appears to be eternally stuck in their Middle Eastern engagement. The last
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two U.S. administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, and current American President,
Joe Biden, have all been unsuccessful in transforming U.S.-Saudi relations. In the U.S. Congress,
opposition to U.S.-Saudi relations escalated following the recent Saudi transgressions of the
2015 war in Yemen and the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. Virtually all
Democratic policymakers, several Republican Congress members, and varying government
officials and analysts, condemn the killing and MBS’s role.154 Democrats and Republicans
reached a consensus that current diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia do not serve U.S.
interests. 155 Congress’ unanimity over the need for a major change is echoed by President Biden.
During his campaign in 2020, Biden condemned Saudi Arabia as a “pariah” and pledged to
reassess U.S.-Saudi relations.156 However, the Biden administration has been reluctant to act on
his plans. Regardless of inaction, the re-evaluation of the U.S.-Saudi partnership is a top priority
in Washington’s foreign policy agenda. The American political consensus seeks diplomatic
change, with Democratic- progressive and Republican-conservative perspectives diverging from
there. The dominant progressive argument is for the U.S.’s reduced engagement with Saudi
Arabia and the Middle East.

Energy Independence
Increased U.S. energy independence boosts the flexibility of U.S. foreign policy to stop
importing oil from unstable regions and to disengage from the Middle East. U.S. liberation from
its traditional regional allies for oil imports reduces the strategic importance of defending the
Persian Gulf and excusing Saudi Arabia’s human rights abuses. The former Deputy Assistant
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Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, Colin Kahl, explains that there is a “general sense in
the Gulf that the United States is politically exhausted.”157 The hefty price of military
involvement, diplomatic tiptoeing, and economic risks has absorbed a lot of U.S. time and
resources since the 1970s energy crisis. With only 7% of U.S. oil coming from Saudi Arabia,
there is little need to worry about the kingdom weaponizing its oil. As a result, the U.S. has the
opportunity to re-examine its relationship with the kingdom and overall involvement in the
region.158 The increase in US oil production convinced then President Trump, many American
politicians, and critics of Middle Eastern involvement that the Persian Gulf has lost its critical
strategic importance. Trump exemplifies this development when he downplays Iran’s 2019
attack on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Trump regards the attack as “very minor” because,
while “other places get such vast amounts of oil there,” Americans “get very little,” and
therefore, “we are not in the position that we used to be in in the Middle East.”159 Since the
U.S.’s progress in domestic oil production, the Gulf and Saudi Arabia have lost influence over
U.S. strategy.
American oil producers additionally are urging for a change in U.S.-Saudi relations. The
boost of oil supply from the U.S. generated increased competition in the global oil market and
threatened Saudi Arabia’s market share. In response to U.S. competition, Saudi Arabia continued
to pump oil into the already saturated market to protect its market share. 160 Since the kingdom
did not fulfill its traditional swing producer role of restricting oil production to balance the new
shale supply with demand, global market prices dropped.
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Consequently, the U.S. shale oil industry strained to make a profit against production
costs. Saudi Arabia played a smart geo-economic strategy by exposing the U.S. shale industry’s
price elasticity and decision-making patterns in a low-oil environment.161 The U.S. shale industry
“switched from a paradigm of growth to one of survival.” 162 The commercial viability of shale
oil depends on the extraction price remaining below the market price, and the prolonged low oil
prices succeeded in threatening the shale oil industry. As a result, American oil producers, as
well as Republican senators from oil-producing states, joined the critics of U.S.-Saudi
relations.163 Despite the U.S.'s increased energy independence, the U.S. oil industry is still being
subjugated to the global oil market and Saudi Arabia’s swing production decisions.

Human Rights Violations
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is based on practical economic, political, and security
objectives rather than moral or ideological concerns. The latter are sources of major friction.
Saudi Arabia ranks just above North Korea in terms of political rights, civil liberties, and other
measures of freedom—all of which conflict with America’s constitutional guarantees.164 The
U.S. has granted the regime a multitude of ‘free passes’ for its human rights abuses and
minimized Saudi connections to Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks. The U.S.’s frequent use of
realpolitik to justify U.S. inaction to Saudi transgressions exemplifies the U.S. government’s fear
of diplomatic conflict or Saudi retaliation, which may manifest in an oil embargo. The U.S. is
failing to hold its Saudi partner accountable for violating U.S. constitutional values, and this
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precedent is fundamentally corrosive to America’s long commitment to protecting human rights,
domestically and overseas.
Critics of Al Saud argue the U.S. cannot transgress against its moral values by embracing
the oppressive monarchy. 165 The substantial criticism over U.S.-Saudi relations has extended to
Congress in recent years. The Saudi regime’s operations in Yemen and the murder of Jamal
Khashoggi exacerbated existing concerns over Saudi leadership and the U.S.’s enduring
engagement.166 The kingdom used American weaponry in its Yemen operations, implicating the
U.S. as a result. 167 The U.S. constitution was founded on the guarantee of universal human rights
and civil freedoms, but these ideals and the U.S.’s reputation are undermined by Saudi Arabia’s
behavior. In addition to military actions, the regime ordered the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal
Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Jamal Khashoggi was a Saudi dissident seeking
asylum in the U.S. while writing for the Washington Post. In his columns, he criticized the
policies of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and consequently Saudi government officials,
with the endorsement of MBS, ordered his overseas murder. 168 The murder was internationally
condemned, and in the U.S., the Trump administration drew wide criticism for its inaction.
Furthermore, an increasing number of Congress members are signaling their discontent and
intention to implement changes in U.S.-Saudi policy, including reducing arms sales to the
kingdom.169
US Military Spending
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In addition to concerns about human rights violations, critics argue that U.S. spending on
Saudi Arabia's military initiatives has inadequate benefits. The U.S. has been involved in a
myriad of wars and military missions in the Middle East since its expansion into the Persian
Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s military agenda, such as challenging Iran, seeking to isolate Qatar, and
fighting an ongoing war in Yemen, deplete the U.S. military budget and impose a shared risk on
U.S. soldiers.170 Additionally, America’s militarization of the Gulf neither insulates nor protects
the world economy from regular and unpredictable disruptions of the region’s oil supply. 171 The
Trump and Biden Administrations and Congress are therefore led to question the value of U.S.Saudi defense cooperation.
Charles L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic developed a cost-benefit analysis of the cost
of the U.S. military versus the value of the oil that comes out of the Persian Gulf. The findings
predict the U.S. would save roughly $75 billion a year with military disengagement, which is
about 15% of its defense budget. 172 The U.S. military uses preventative action to safeguard Gulf
oil from potential disruptions; however, the effectiveness of this mode of action is complex and
hypothetical. Regardless of the reality of the U.S. military’s preventative success, Glaser and
Rosemary’s analysis determines that U.S. defense costs of preventing a major disruption of Gulf
oil exceed the value of oil that the U.S. receives from the Gulf. 173 Reducing involvement with
Saudi Arabia and in the Persian Gulf would undoubtedly save the U.S. money.
Another prominent critique of U.S. military involvement discredits the effectiveness of
the U.S. role in the Middle East’s stability. The U.S. seeks to aid the region’s balance of power
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and Saudi Arabia’s stabilizing influence. However, Tamara Cofman Wittes, a senior fellow in
the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, argues that lasting stability in the
Middle East can only be accomplished between the “rulers and the ruled.” 174 She claims that real
change “cannot be driven by the United States without far more carrots and sticks than
Washington is prepared to deploy.” 175 The U.S. is supporting the region’s stability and security,
but without the U.S.’s presence, the Middle East will likely fall back into dysfunction. Yet,
Wittes is not arguing for the necessity of the U.S. military; rather, she is unveiling the reality that
U.S. external influence is a waste of money and resources. The Middle East can only
successfully create lasting stability through implementing change from within its populace and
political institutions. Therefore, the U.S. should reduce military interference, including security
cooperation and arms sales, and provide the region with the opportunity for self-reflection and
achievement.
U.S. military disengagement is progressively imperative under Prince Mohammad’s rule.
In recent years, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has adopted an assertive and occasionally
aggressive approach.176 Consequently, the U.S.-Saudi partnership “risks implicating and
entangling the United States in conflicts not of its choosing,” while Saudi Arabia neglects “its
past role funding and stabilizing U.S. partners.”177The kingdom is exemplifying a gross
dereliction of ally duties, which draws the U.S. to question the value of the U.S.-Saudi
relationship. The value proposition, which is a tool to measure the benefits resulting from an
alliance, simply “isn’t there” for the U.S. 178 In other terms, the relationship does not serve a win-
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win scenario for U.S.-Saudi mutual benefit—only Saudi Arabia is benefiting from continued
U.S. military support. Consequently, critics argue that the U.S. should adopt “a distant,
evenhanded approach rooted in diplomatic tools” instead of military engagement. 179 The U.S.
upholds the status quo of military-centric foreign policy but suboptimal relations with Saudi
Arabia provoke the U.S. for progressive change. A decreased military presence in the Middle
East will reduce U.S. risk and endorse a constructive shift in U.S.-Saudi diplomacy.180

Economic Security
The shared risk within U.S.-Saudi military cooperation extends to their bilateral
economic relations. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia’s economic interdependence generally generates
mutual economic gains, but the partnership also poses a liability. The U.S. must consider the
kingdom’s economic policy and concerns that may present harmful fallout on U.S. businesses
and investment.181 Economic interference embeds the U.S. in a matrix of Saudi Arabia’s
problems, whether the problems are economic, political, or security. In terms of bilateral trade
relations, the U.S. Trade Representative office has raised concerns with “Saudi customs
practices, regulatory barriers,” and “intellectual property rights policies.” 182 These concerns are
assessed by the U.S. State Department in its 2019 Investment Climate Statement, which states
that the Saudi government’s actions have "led to a negative impact on the investment climate"
and "gave rise to additional investor concerns over rule of law, business predictability, and
political risk." 183 While the Saudi government is pursuing economic transformation plans,
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international observers and investors fear the reliability and security of trading and investing
under the regime’s current economic laws and practices. 184 Since the shale revolution has
ignited America’s manufacturing revival and increased U.S. competitiveness in the world
economy, the U.S. has the opportunity to reduce economic interdependence with Saudi Arabia in
exchange for increased and reliable domestic and international investment. 185

U.S. Arguments for Disengagement: Analysis & Conclusion
Saudi Arabia’s value proposition to the U.S. under the current state of relations is weak. As
Saudi Arabia undergoes seismic political changes under Prince Mohammed bin Salam’s
leadership, the kingdom is no longer a strong U.S. ally. MBS and his pattern of aggressive
foreign policy are irreconcilable with U.S. values and interests. Saudi Arabia’s recent
international behavior is driven by reckless self-interest and fuels chaos and instability in the
Middle East, which both conflict with the U.S. political agenda. The kingdom under MBS’s rule
has lost its viability to the U.S. Additionally, the kingdom’s disregard for international law and
humanitarian values in its decision-making denounces the Saudi regime’s trustworthiness.
Multiple U.S. policymakers worry that Saudi Arabia is on the path to becoming a rogue state. 186
The U.S. is exhausted from the volatility of Saudi Arabia’s behavior, and the shale revolution
presents the long-awaited opportunity to implement fundamental changes to the U.S.-Saudi
relationship. Increased U.S. energy independence relieves much of the nation’s fear of scarcity
and mitigates its dependency on overseas oil. As a result, OPEC cannot weaponize oil to
influence U.S. political action. Therefore, U.S. foreign policy is more flexible and can afford to
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pursue interests beyond the protection of Middle Eastern oil. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have a
reduced strategic interest for the U.S., and therefore, the U.S. can be more assertive in its policy
expectations of the kingdom. Washington no longer needs to evoke realpolitik to rationalize
“free passes” for Saudi Arabia’s human rights abuses and regional military ventures. The U.S.
can hold the Saudi regime accountable for its transgressions.
The reduced strategic interest of Saudi and Persian Gulf oil additionally provides the
rationale to reduce U.S. military involvement in the region. While the U.S. and Saudi kingdom
have generally shared the agenda of maintaining stability and the balance of power in the Middle
East, MBS’s confrontational behavior, such as with instigating a war with Yemen, exemplifies
the Saudi divergence from U.S.-Saudi joint political values. The U.S. has empowered Saudi
Arabia in the Middle East in order to minimize disruptions to the global oil market. According to
the foundation of the U.S.-Saudi alliance, the U.S. promised the kingdom security. However, the
kingdom is stretching this promise thin through confrontational and aggressive behavior towards
its regional neighbors. The U.S. cannot afford to continuously support Saudi security from
regional threats when the kingdom is instigating conflict. Turmoil in the Middle East is enduring,
but the U.S. offered security under the assumption that Saudi Arabia would be a stabilizing force
in the region. The trend of MBS’s recent behavior not only raises regional disruption, but the
trajectory indicates that U.S. military support will be increasingly solicited. Enduring U.S.
military support of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf is unprofitable, unsustainable, and
ineffectual in instilling lasting regional stability.
Lastly, the economic interdependence that has bolstered the U.S.-Saudi relation since the
1970s energy crisis subjects the U.S. to an unreliable trading and investment partner. MBS’s
non-diplomatic international behavior presents serious concerns over the kingdom’s
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trustworthiness in economic relations. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s government-centered
economy employs non-transparent policies and regulations. U.S.-Saudi economic
interdependence has been mutually beneficial, but the shale-instigated U.S. manufacturing
revival and increased global economic competitiveness pose new domestic and international
trade and investment opportunities. As a result, the U.S. has the freedom to replace Saudi Arabia
with a dependable and transparent economic partner.
The foregoing reasons are the most adamantly raised justifications for why the U.S.
should reduce its involvement with Saudi Arabia. Additional reasons may fall under this
umbrella argument, and their exclusions from this discussion do not negate their value.
Furthermore, American policymakers, government officials, and analysts may agree with all or
select rationales for decreased engagement, but regardless, each reason has its respective merit.
Lastly, the consequences for reducing involvement in Saudi Arabia and the Middle East will be
explained below in the arguments for maintaining involvement.

U.S. Arguments for Preserving Involvement
Introduction
In contrast to the preceding Democratic arguments for U.S. disengagement, Republicans
argue for sustaining the current degree of U.S.-Saudi engagement under the pretext of crafting a
relationship reform. While the recent direction of Saudi Arabia foreign policy diverges from U.S.
interests, the partnership’s value remains, albeit dormant. A U.S.-Saudi foreign policy reform
will redefine the partnership’s status quo to enforce Saudi accountability and strengthen Saudi
Arabia’s value proposition to the U.S. A progressive policy correction for U.S.-Saudi relations
present the opportunity for the U.S.’s enduring hegemony and projection of regional interests.
Hegemony supports American leadership in the Middle East across economic, political, and
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security domains. The modern world is becoming more and more globalized, and Middle Eastern
hegemony grants the U.S. the ability to exert external decision-making power in regional and
international relations. Continuous U.S. engagement in the Middle East, especially with ensuing
realigned and rebalanced U.S.-Saudi relations, is in the U.S.’s best strategic interest. In this
section, the pro-involvement arguments will be introduced and discussed to highlight Saudi
Arabia and the Middle East’s enduring value to the U.S. The arguments include U.S. regional
interest in the balance of power, security, global oil market, economic, and petrodollar interests.

Balance of Power & Security Interests
U.S. hegemony in the Middle East endorses the U.S.’s foreign policy agenda and safeguards
against regional security concerns. The U.S. uses its regional and global influence to monitor the
equilibrium of the Middle East’s balance of power for a myriad of reasons, only one of which is
the stabilization of the global oil market. Predominantly, the U.S. values its hegemony and
ability to influence the region to act in accordance to U.S. preferences. 187 Washington values its
geopolitical influence in the region, and U.S. hegemony renders the balance of power inoperable,
minimizing security competition from a rival power. Furthermore, the U.S. has favorable
relations, such as with the GCC member nations, Israel, and Egypt, who condone the U.S.’s
regional presence and are more likely (than non-supportive nations) to support the U.S.’s foreign
initiatives. Therefore, the U.S. has strategic interests, beyond access to oil, in maintaining its
Middle Eastern hegemony.
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The U.S.’s partnership and strong security ties with Saudi Arabia additionally aid the
U.S.’s national security interests. The GCC and U.S.-Saudi joint initiatives address regional
forces of instability, such as Iran’s hegemonic ambitions. 188 If radical nations, such as Iran, gain
a monopoly of power in the region, the consequences would extend from the global oil market to
the world’s national, economic, and energy security. MIT professor and economist, Morris A.
Adleman, argues that “[m]ore money in the hands of the soon-to-be-dubbed ‘outlaw’ or ‘rogue’
states will likely mean a less peaceful world.” 189 Pariah regimes with an influx of wealth will
have unpredictable and detrimental ramifications on global security. The GCC security
cooperation agreement and American military presence in the Persian Gulf act as a deterrence to
any rogue power’s efforts to obtain preponderance over the region’s oil resources. 190 The U.S
military and GCC are therefore strategically important in establishing a security umbrella over
their shared regional interests.
In addition to protecting the balance of power, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia share ambitions to
end the global war on terror, and the Saudi regime has emerged as a productive counterterrorism
partner to the U.S. since 2003. 191 The U.S. and Saudi Arabia governments view Al Qaeda, the
Islamic State (ISIS), and other Salafist-jihadist groups as direct threats to their national security.
192
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“ongoing and productive.”194 In 2017, Saudi Arabia held a Riyadh Forum on Countering
Extremism & Fighting Terrorism, where MBS reaffirmed the kingdom’s agenda to “destroy the
extremists.”195 Saudi anti-terrorism agenda aligns with the U.S., and during former President
Trump's attendance at the conference, he discussed how his administration could organize the
Persian Gulf and Muslim countries to combat terror together. 196 A member of Saudi Arabia’s
Shoura Council regarded Trump’s visit as instilling new hope against terror and extremism. 197
Saudi Arabia presents a paradox in U.S. counterterrorism. The Saudi government works
closely with US counterterrorism, while also cultivating a “climate of radicalization.”198 Saudi
Arabia has occasionally supported terrorist actors who are outside the periphery of the
government but still important figures for the regime’s legitimacy. 199 Al Qaeda attacks on 9/11
are an example of the paradox of Saudi Arabia’s relationship with terrorism. Despite these
complexities, Saudi Arabia plays a key role in counterterrorism. As the Middle East is most
impacted by terrorism, and Saudi Arabia is Islam’s heartland, the U.S. is granted vital access to
monitor and address terrorist activity. Current George Mason University professor and expert on
the Middle East, Mark N. Katz, argues that “it matters very much whether the government of the
country containing Islam’s two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, is willing to cooperate with
America and the West or is hostile to them.” 200 Anti-Americanism is rooted in the U.S.’s long
history of disturbance in the Middle East, and U.S.-Saudi and Gulf counterterrorism cooperation
promotes U.S. security interests and U.S. diplomatic relations with the Arab world.
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Global Oil Market
The Shale Revolution reduced the risk of physical supply disruptions to U.S. energy
security. However, supply does not insulate nations’ economies from the price shocks that arise
from conflict and crises in the Middle East. The U.S. has increased oil production, but the U.S.
economy is vulnerable to the price shocks in the global oil market. Colin Kahl argues that the
U.S. economy is linked to the Middle East “even if we didn’t import a single drop of oil from
that part of the world.”201 While unpredictable effects, such as natural disasters, cannot be
prevented, minimizing disruption to the market when possible is in the U.S. economic interest.
Saudi Arabia can aid U.S. market stabilization interests through apolitical swing production. The
Saudi regime stabilizes the oil market regardless of politics, while radical regimes, such as Iran,
would be more likely to interfere with the region’s oil flow for a political end. Through the U.S.
relationship with the kingdom, threatening nations are prevented from dominating the oil market
and wielding oil as a political weapon. Alongside regional threats, Al Saud faces a myriad of
internal threats that must be addressed to effectively undertake the kingdom’s role in market and
oil price stabilization. The state of the market and the world’s energy security depends on the
enduring political legitimacy of Al Saud and the kingdom’s stability. The kingdom’s concerns
are consequently the U.S.’s concerns as well. While the Saudi regime will not always adhere to
U.S. advice, the partnership preserves U.S. influence and supervision of Saudi’s market
stabilization and the Gulf’s flow of oil.

Economic Relations
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Although the U.S.-Saudi economic relationship is transitioning away from their
traditional exchange based on oil exports for U.S. dollars, there remain strong ties in bilateral
trade and investment. Saudi Arabia ranks among the richest countries in the world because of its
oil revenue.202 The U.S. and Saudi Arabia’s increased economic interdependence since the
1970s, in conjunction with the kingdom’s extreme wealth, has bolstered bilateral economic
relations. As of 2019, Saudi Arabia is the U.S.’s second-largest trading partner in the Middle
East. According to the U.S. International Trade Administration, U.S. imports from Saudi Arabia
in 2019 were worth $13.4 billion, and U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia were valued at $14.3
billion.203 The high value of U.S.-Saudi trade in 2019 is dictated by imports of oil from Saudi
Arabia, and U.S. exports of weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia.
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U.S. imports of oil is down significantly from 2018 because of shale oil, but Saudi Arabia is still
the top buyer of U.S. weapons.205 The U.S. Aerospace & Defense (A&D) sector is one of the
nation’s most influential industries in the U.S. economy. A&D’s 2020 report quantifies that its
total industry sales have contributed a combined economic value of $396 billion, which
represents 1.8% of total U.S. GDP. 206 Additionally, A&D's 2.2 million employees represented
1.4% of the total U.S. workforce. 207 U.S. defense sales, tax revenue, and economic stimulation
have an immense impact on the U.S. economy. As Saudi Arabia is the U.S.’s number one
weapon’s customer, maintaining a monopolization on Saudi defense consumption is in the U.S.’s
best economic interest. 208 Additionally, while the U.S. has expressed concern over Saudi trade
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practices, the U.S. Trade Representative's 2019 National Trade Estimate Report notes progress
and increased cooperation in Saudi’s trade practices. 209
In addition to trade, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have strong investment ties. The U.S.
government and companies invest in a myriad of Saudi Arabian initiatives, including developing
natural resources, strengthening education opportunities, and addressing economic and security
challenges.210 Not only does the U.S. invest in Saudi Arabia, but a third of the kingdom’s
international investments are in U.S. assets.211 Furthermore, MBS’s Vision 2030 plan will
expand the kingdom’s investment opportunities and market access, which will bolster U.S.-Saudi
economic relations. As a part of the plan’s agenda for economic reform, Saudi Arabia initiated
the privatization of Saudi Aramco, offering 1.5% of the company on the Riyadh stock exchange
on December 11, 2019. 212 While the initial public offering (IPO) was small, the shares topped
out at $29.4 billion, becoming the “most valuable company in the world.” 213 The kingdom’s
privatization and investment opportunities will expand under the Vision 2030 economic agenda,
which presents significant U.S. investment opportunities.

The Petrodollar System
Petrodollars have greatly helped elevate the U.S. dollar as the world’s most dominant
currency in the financial markets. The petrodollar system is founded on the U.S.- Saudi Arabian
Joint Economic Commission and the petrodollar precedent Saudi Arabia set for OPEC. However,
a myriad reasons, including the decline in the value of the U.S. dollar, has caused some nations,
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such as Iran, Russia, and China, to debate the benefits of keeping the dollar as the base value for
oil exports.214 China is already beginning to draw away from petrodollars and has been putting
pressure on Saudi Arabia to switch to “petroyuan.” 215 Additionally, Venezuela has abandoned the
petrodollar since 2017, using the yuan and euros instead. 216 The trend of nations’ moving away
from the petrodollar makes the U.S. decision to maintain involvement with Saudi Arabia and the
Middle East even more essential. The U.S. and the petrodollar system will undoubtedly be
replaced by another power if the U.S. drawbacks. The economic fallout of the petrodollar
system’s collapse would be momentous. The dollar’s value as the world’s reserve currency
would collapse, and likely impose depression on the U.S. economy. Furthermore, the U.S. would
lose its economic influence over how the Arab world spends its petrodollars.
Vitalis’ term “petrocapitalism” describes how recycling petrodollars in ways constructive
to the US goals is vital to America’s economic security and growth. 217 Regardless of the U.S.
energy independence, Mark N. Katz argues that “the West is much better off if actors in the Gulf
continue to be willing to invest in and trade with the West, or whether they do this more with
Asia.”218 Petrodollars are the “lifeblood” of capitalism and the U.S. economy, and therefore, the
U.S. maintains its interdependence with Saudi Arabia.219 Over the years, Saudi Arabia has
“financed the federal government's budget deficit; spent billions on US design and development
projects; bankrolled the US allied counter revolutionaries; paid for the CIA's covert wars; kept
General Dynamics’ assembly lines humming; contributed cash to foundations, centers, charities,
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universities, K street, and the paid-to-think-tanks; aided the pentagon's bottom line.”220 Saudi
Arabia offers significant investment to the U.S, and the U.S.’s commitment to Saudi Arabia and
JECOR will sustain the relationship’s economic value. Considering many countries favor the dedollarization of oil exports, the U.S.’s economic welfare depends on minimizing as many
disruptions as possible.

U.S. Arguments for Preserving Engagement: Analysis & Conclusion
U.S. hegemony in the Middle East is of the utmost importance for U.S. political, security,
and economic interests. American primacy grants the U.S. relative freedom of action in the
region to promote U.S. national interests, such as counterterrorism and restricting the expansion
of rival powers. While Saudi Arabia does not seek to replace the U.S., the kingdom has warned
the U.S. in times of contention, that the U.S. can be replaced as the kingdom’s hard power. U.S.
arguments for disengagement would open a power vacuum in the Middle East, which Saudi
Arabia can either fill through a partnership with another superpower, such as Russia or China, or
an politically ambitious Middle Eastern nation, such as Iran. Without U.S.-Saudi relations,
American hegemony in the region will have weakened support, and the kingdom’s new powerbacker will likely contest U.S. dominance.
The growing support for isolationism among Republicans and Democrats represents an
American forfeit its global struggle for power with Russia and China. Further, disengagement
harms U.S. interests in Middle Eastern peace, universal human rights, stable global energy
markets, and economic power. While arguments for disengagement cite Saudi Arabia’s human
rights violations to justify reducing U.S.-Saudi relations, peace and human rights are unlikely to
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improve and perhaps even worsen, under a subsequent U.S. successor. Furthermore, U.S. efforts
to stabilize the region’s balance of power, which minimizes the disruptions to the global oil
market, are vital to not only the U.S. oil industry but also to the world’s energy security.
Regardless of U.S energy independence, the oil market is interconnected, and every nation’s
energy security is vulnerable to supply and price fluctuations in the global oil market.
U.S.-Saudi economic interdependence, including the volume of bilateral trade and
investment, bolsters the American economy. Moreover, investment opportunities in Saudi Arabia
are projected to increase with MBS’s Vision 2030 economic reform plans, such as with the
kingdom’s privatization of Aramco oil. Currently, the kingdom is the largest consumer of the
U.S. military industry materials and provides a stream of revenue for the American economy,
including increasing U.S. tax revenue, sustaining millions of jobs, and bolstering economic
activity. Saudi Arabia’s vast oil wealth and investment opportunity in its diversifying economy
present an important revenue source for U.S. government and business.
Still, the most valuable U.S. economic benefit that has arisen from U.S.-Saudi relations is
the petrodollar system. While the U.S. can find new and perhaps more reliable economic
partners, as arguments for disengagement urge, the U.S. cannot replace the benefits of
petrodollars and petrodollar recycling on the American economy. The dollar denomination for
oil revenue in the global oil market sustains the purchasing power of the American dollar.
Furthermore, the surplus of dollar reserves for oil exporters leads to petrodollar recycling,
increasing investment in the U.S., and demand for U.S. assets. The petrodollar system bolsters
U.S. economic activity and dollar value, but these rewards are dependent on Saudi Arabia and
OPEC’s endorsement. The petrodollar system and its proliferation to OPEC can be accredited to
Saudi Arabia’s agreement with the U.S. following the 1970s energy crisis. However, the decline
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of the dollar’s purchasing power is raising international pushback against its use as the
denomination of oil revenue. The results of this debate among oil-exporters could imperil the
U.S. dollar and economy. Consequently, the U.S. must not draw back from Saudi Arabia, as the
kingdom and its swing producer role are the main guarantor of the petrodollar system. American
supremacy in the Gulf is critical in protecting the dollar as the world’s oil revenue currency.
In conclusion, I would proffer that U.S. arguments for maintaining engagement with
Saudi Arabia and the Middle East surpass those for disengagement. Nonetheless, the rationale
for U.S. disengagement provides highly valuable context for determining the degree of
corrections in U.S.-Saudi relations. The conclusion of the paper will discuss the U.S.’s proposed
options to address the contention within the current state of the alliance.

Chapter III: Conclusion & Analysis
The U.S.-Saudi relationship presents value to both sides; however, the U.S.’s willingness
to continue engagement with the kingdom depends on foreign policy reform that recasts
partnership expectations. The reform of U.S.-Saudi relations will require some concessions on
behalf of Saudi Arabia, and the kingdom must be willing to cooperate with the U.S.’s agenda.
The kingdom’s political evolution and recent actions under MBS leave reason for concern over
Saudi pushback to partnership changes. MBS has an ambitious foreign policy agenda, which he
will likely be reluctant to subrogate to U.S. desires. However, considering the duration of the
U.S.-Saudi relationship and the continued value that the U.S. offers as one of the world’s largest
superpowers, I hypothesize Saudi Arabia will negotiate and ultimately agree to U.S. demands for
change. Additionally, the reform proposals for U.S.-Saudi relations will be amenable to both
nations’ interests.
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Saudi Arabia’s recommitment to its stabilizing role in the Middle East exemplifies one of
the U.S.’s objectives that will ultimately support the kingdom’s national interests. U.S.-Saudi
reformed relations will realign U.S.-Saudi diplomatic goals of de-escalating conflict in the
Middle East. Saudi Arabia will reprise its traditional role as a regionally constructive force,
which would include ending the kingdom’s campaign in Yemen. The U.S. will withdraw its
support of the Saudi military in the war, and in exchange for the kingdom’s cooperation, the U.S.
will bolster its defense against Saudi’s legitimate regional threats, such as Iran and extremist
groups. 221 Saudi Arabia’s reprisal of its role will reduce external threats against the kingdom,
especially with the U.S. doubling down on the kingdom’s defense. Additionally, the kingdom
will have greater resources to lend to its other threats, such as public dissent and oil dependence,
as well as to MBS’s domestic initiatives, like the Vision 2030 plan. While a U.S.-Saudi relations
reform will increase U.S. influence over the kingdom’s political action, overall, the policy
propositions will enhance both nations’ strategic interests.

U.S. Foreign Policy Proposals & Conclusion
My thesis analysis and subsequent conclusion support a progressive course correction as
the optimal strategy for U.S. foreign policy in Saudi Arabia. The arguments for sustained U.S.Saudi relations, which I enumerate in Chapter III, verify the partnership’s enduring value for
American interests while predicated on an imminent reform. The United States must articulate
and execute major changes to the terms of U.S.-Saudi cooperation to escape the status quo while
minimizing the possibility of “rupturing relations.”222 While Saudi Arabia values its U.S.
partnership, the kingdom under MBS’s rule prioritizes Saudi interest at the expense of traditional
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U.S.-Saudi regional interests and a balanced relationship. The U.S. must withstand Saudi
pushback, maintain diplomatic cooperation, and reassert its considerable leverage in the
relationship. 223
The aim of a progressive policy is to address the shortcomings of President Roosevelt and
King ibn Saud’s 1945 agreement. The expectations of the U.S.-Saudi “special relationship,”
beyond an oil for security agreement, were never clear. Even the premise of the exchange is
nebulous, as Vitalis reveals that U.S. energy security was never dependent on Saudi oil. This
ambiguity leaves many Americans wondering what value Saudi Arabia provides the U.S. if not
for oil, especially after the shale revolution. As this paper discusses, the U.S. receives a multitude
of political, economic, and security benefits from its Saudi relations and Middle Eastern
hegemony. However, the birth of the relationship left no guidelines for the two nations to
reference in the ensuing decades, and while the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have shared many goals,
their strategic visions and values have often been divergent from the beginning. These
divergences have historically and consistently been rationalized by U.S. realpolitik, but the shale
revolution and increased U.S. energy independence marks the end of U.S. tolerance of the
kingdom’s morally and legally regressive behavior. While Washington policymakers are in the
infancy stage of drawing a reform proposal, the agenda is clear: cultivate a balanced and
“working” U.S.-Saudi relationship that reflects U.S. leverage and interest. 224
The success of a reform depends on Saudi Arabia’s willingness to agree to meaningful
policy changes. MBS has an ambitious foreign policy agenda, which he will likely be reluctant to
humble, and the Saudi regime will undoubtedly oppose some U.S. demands. However, a close
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relationship with the U.S. is of greater value to Saudi Arabia than what Russia, China, or any
other power can offer as an ally. 225 A good working relationship with the U.S. includes the
world’s strongest military for protection against external threats, trade and investment with the
largest economy, and top innovation and technology from universities and the energy
industries—to name a few.226 The U.S. can leverage these benefits to negotiate the necessary
progressive course correction for relations.
Daniel Benaim’s 2020 TCF Report offers policy recommendations for U.S.-Saudi
reform, which, like U.S. arguments, draws upon interviews with a multitude of government
officials and IR experts. Additionally, Benaim is currently the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Arabian Peninsula Affairs and was formerly a Middle East policy advisor to Vice
President Biden. As a result of his experience, Benaim is an expert authority on U.S. policy,
U.S.-Saudi relations, and the ongoing debate in Washington. In the TCF Report, Benaim argues
the recalibration of U.S.–Saudi relations must begin with offering the kingdom a choice. The
viability of future relations depends on cooperation and compromise, and a test will gauge the
Saudi regime’s desire to make meaningful policy changes.227 Benaim drafts the choice that
Washington should offer Riyadh: “Saudi Arabia can reset its relationship with the United States
by demonstrating a desire to work closely with Washington to craft a more consultative, less
confrontational approach across a range of issues. If Riyadh fails to do this, it can expect to see
strategic cooperation with Washington grow increasingly limited as other nations take
precedence.” 228 The kingdom’s unwillingness to reasonably negotiate and accept U.S. demands
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would necessitate a further assessment of U.S. disengagement arguments. Alternatively, Saudi
Arabia’s demonstration of willingness will commence a U.S.-led six-month strategic review of
all aspects of U.S.–Saudi cooperation. 229 The evaluation will highlight the points of contention
in the partnership, such as disparate U.S.-Saudi national interests, that will provide the
comprehension to shape and reform U.S.-Saudi relations. The TCF report offers a multitude of
persuasive policy recommendations to recalibrate U.S.-Saudi relations, but the full scope of
policy proposals and a conclusion of what policy or policies are best is not within the scope of
my thesis.230
One policy suggestion to reform U.S.-Saudi relations, as well as test the kingdom’s
commitment, requires Saudi’s reprisal of its regionally constructive and stabilization role. 231 The
U.S.’s 1945 agreement to defend the kingdom was under the assumption that Saudi Arabia’s
foreign policy prioritizes Middle Eastern peace. Consequently, U.S. expectations are broken by
MBS’s aggressive international behavior, and the U.S. military is being drawn upon to aid Saudiled conflict. The criteria for U.S. military engagement on behalf of the kingdom are unexplicit,
thereby raising confusion over when U.S. defense is expected, such as during the war in Yemen.
Therefore, this policy proposal addresses the kingdom’s divergence from its traditional
stabilizing role, as well as the expectations for the U.S. military.
Essentially, Benaim recommends the U.S. pose an ultimatum to Saudi Arabia. The
kingdom must agree to cooperate in the development of a progressive policy correction,
including MBS ceasing his assertive foreign agenda, or the U.S. will disengage from the
partnership. In response to this choice, Saudi Arabia will be urged to act more responsibly, such
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as through initiating a Yemen ceasefire or pledging to stop all overseas persecution of Saudi
dissidents. A Saudi choice to act more responsibly will aid U.S. confidence over the direction of
relations, and the U.S. must remain hyper aware of Saudi pressures to revert to relations’ old
status quo and seek opportunities for affirmative cooperation. Alternatively, if the Saudi regime
persists in its reckless international behavior, the kingdom will signal its disregard for an
enduring partnership with the U.S. Consequently, Washington will be prompted to re-consider
the spectrum of U.S. disengagement from the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia’s compliance to this policy suggestion will realign American and Saudi
interest in protecting Middle Eastern stability and the global oil market, as well promote the
nations’ respective interests. Reformed U.S.-Saudi relations and enduring U.S. engagement in
the Middle East will sustain U.S. hegemony and political prowess to protect its interests. The
promotion of Middle Eastern stability and de-escalation may furthermore present the opportunity
for the U.S. to reduce its regional force posture, thereby reducing U.S. military spending. 232
Reformed U.S.-Saudi relations will further promote the joint campaign against global terrorism
and pave the way for confident bilateral economic relations. U.S.-Saudi economic
interdependence will help the kingdom implement its Vision 2030 plans for transforming its oildependent economy, help assuage internal dissent, as well as ease Saudi’s financial burden from
shale’s impacts on the global oil market.
Despite the lack of a partnership guideline, U.S.-Saudi relations have persevered through
five Saudi kings, twelve U.S. presidents, and a multitude of seismic global events. 233 However,
along the way, U.S.-Saudi mutual trust has been damaged. A progressive course correction will
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provide subsequent administrations with “more durable terms for cooperation” to guide the
resolution of inevitable disagreements and political pressures.234 These guidelines will hold the
U.S. and Saudi kingdom accountable for their respective behaviors, and consequently, strengthen
mutual trust. Differences will inevitably still arise in the new course of relations, and this reform
will not eradicate all the challenges in international relations. However, the importance of a
progressive course correction is to lay a foundation, with clear expectations and guidelines, that
will foster a balanced and effective U.S.-Saudi relationship in a more peaceful Middle East.
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